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1. Introduction
Rooted in the seminal work of Samuelson (1938), the weak (generalized) axiom of
revealed preference (WGARP) has been seen as a minimal, normatively appealing, and
potentially empirically robust consistency condition of choice.1 WGARP states that, for
any pair of observations xt and xs, when a consumer chooses xt with xs being affordable,
it must be that xt is at least as expensive when she chooses xs. While a natural condition
of choice consistency, no behavioral justification for WGARP has been given. The main
contribution of this paper is to provide a new notion of rationality that is equivalent
to WGARP, and to develop a comprehensive revealed-preference theory based on this
notion. The proposed notion brings to the forefront the concept of reference points, as a
framing relevant to each pairwise comparison. Indeed, the consumer acts as if any pairwise
comparison colors her preferences over all possible choices she makes. The importance
of our theoretical development is that it allows us to recover preferences, and to do
welfare analysis on the basis of WGARP-consistent data sets that cannot be generated by
standard utility maximization.
Standard utility maximization requires, in addition to WGARP-consistency, transitivity
of preferences, against which there is abundant experimental and field evidence (Quah
(2006)). The potential lack of robustness of the transitivity requirement on preferences
motivated the seminal work of Kihlstrom et al. (1976), which essentially proposes to
rewrite the entire theory of demand on the basis of WGARP alone. More recently,
practitioners have recognized some difficulties surrounding the computational complexity
of using standard utility maximization in setups of empirical interest (e.g., stochastic
utility maximization is NP-hard to check, Kitamura and Stoye (2018)). In response, there
has been a renewed interest in using WGARP as a minimalist version of the standard
model of rationality, in works such as Blundell et al. (2008), Hoderlein and Stoye (2014),
Cosaert and Demuynck (2018), and Cherchye et al. (2019). All these contributions are
concerned with the use of WGARP to test rationality, the recovery of preferences, and
the performance of welfare analysis.2
We find that a data set is consistent with WGARP if and only if it can be rationalized
by a maximin preference function. We say that a data set OT = {pt, xt}t∈T (a collection
of prices and commodity bundles) is weakly rationalized by a preference function r :
X ×X → R if, for all t, r(xt, x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ X that is affordable at prices pt (and
wealth ptxt).
1Samuelson (1938) originally was interested in demand functions, and studied the Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preference (WARP). Following Varian (1982) we argue that it is empirically more convenient to
work with demand correspondences. To accomodate this we study both WGARP and WARP but focus
on the former.
2In all of them, WGARP is usually stated without indifference, because the object of interest is a
demand function, not a demand correspondence. We cover both here.
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We now define a maximin preference function. Let U be a finite index set, and
∆(U) the probability simplex on U . A reference point consists of two arbitrary price-
commodity bundle pairs ((pi, xi), (pj, xj)) where i, j ∈ U . Then, uij : X 7→ R denotes a
reference-dependent utility function. Note that each utility function has a double subscript,
indicating the two situations in the reference point. We require that the order of such
situations not matter (i.e., the reference-point pair refers to the bilateral comparison
between choices i and j: uij = uji). We say that a data set is weakly rationalized by a
maximin preference function if for any x, y ∈ X, we can write r(x, y) as:
r(x, y) = max
µ∈∆(U)
min
λ∈∆(U)
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈U
λiµj(uij(x)− uij(y)).
Also, fixing a situation indexed by i, consisting of the price-bundle (pi, xi), we require
that for all reference points involving i ∈ U , it must be that uij(xi) ≥ uij(y) for all y ∈ X
such that pixi ≥ piy. In this sense, the choice involved in the price-bundle (pi, xi) can be
“rationalized” according to the reference-dependent utility functions uij for all j ∈ U .
Maximin rationalization can be interpreted as an aggregation of preferences of an
individual with multiple utility functions that are heterogeneous, due to reference de-
pendence. If this consumer is asked to make up her mind about how to compare any
pair of observations, how would she aggregate her different preferences if her behavior is
consistent with WGARP? We show that this consumer has a preference function that is
the maximum over the minimal difference among the local utilities of the two bundles.
This consumer is cautious, in that she first looks at the smallest differences between
utilities, and only then maximizes among them.
Alternatively, when focusing on the bilateral comparison between bundles x and
y, which can be colored by their interactions with each situation or reference point
((pi, xi), (pj, xj)), where the consumer commits to be pairwise consistent, the maximin
preference function r(x, y) admits a game-theoretic interpretation. It can be interpreted as
the outcome of two adversarial selves within the decision maker: (i) The former self, with a
payoff function in their zero-sum game equal to uij(x)−uij(y), and choosing mixed-strategy
µ ∈ ∆(U) over the choice situations; (ii) the latter self, with the negative of those payoffs,
and choosing mixed-strategy λ ∈ ∆(U). This is similar to the self-equilibrium notion in
Kőszegi and Rabin (2006). The adversarial self captures the idea that this consumer is
aware that her preferences may change strongly but wants to remain consistent in certain
pairwise situations.
Whatever the interpretation, it follows that maximin rationalization implies that the
preference function is bounded above (resp., below) by the maximum (resp., minimum) of
differences of utilities of any two bundles over reference points. This maximin aggregation
of local utilities extends a partial, reflexive, and asymmetric order (the direct revealed-
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preference relation3 under WGARP) to a complete, reflexive, and asymmetric order on
the grand-commodity set. In fact, we show that the maximin preference function is
skew-symmetric, a key property of nontransitive consumers, first proposed by Shafer
(1974) (i.e., r(x, y) = −r(y, x) for all x, y ∈ X). In addition, for a given x, y ∈ X, the
maximin is attained at a particular reference point, meaning that the model is locally
equivalent to one where the consumer maximizes a utility function. Indeed,
r(x, y) = ui∗j∗(x)− ui∗j∗(y),
for some i∗, j∗ ∈ U .
The classical notion of rationalization by a utility function states that a data set OT
can be rationalized by a utility function u : X → R if u(xt) ≥ u(x) for all x ∈ X such
that x is affordable at prices pt (and wealth ptxt). Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) show
that the classical notion of rationality is equivalent to the Generalized Axiom of Revealed
Preference (GARP). In the current work, we show that a data set that satisfies WGARP,
but perhaps not GARP, is consistent with a local notion of rationalization. Of course,
classical utility maximization is a special case of maximin rationalization when there is a
(global) utility function u that is capable of rationalizing the data set OT . In that case,
r(x, y) = u(x)− u(y) for all x, y ∈ X; in other words, u = uij for all i, j ∈ U .
Equipped with the equivalence between maximin rationalization and WGARP, we
answer the four fundamental questions of nonparametric demand analysis posed by Varian
(1982):
• (i) (Consistency) When is behavior consistent with maximin rationalization?
• (ii) (Recoverability/Welfare) How can we recover preferences or make welfare infer-
ences on the basis of observed behavior?
• (iii) (Forecasting/Counterfactuals) How can we forecast what demand will be at a
new price? and
• (iv) (Shape constraints) When is observed behavior consistent with maximizing a
preference function that has specific shape constraints?
The foregoing discussion has already sketched the answer to item (i) , and stated the
equivalence between WGARP and maximin rationalization (Theorem 1). Along similar
lines, we also show that the strict version of maximin rationalization is equivalent to
WARP4 (Theorem 2).
Next, we turn to item (ii), which we believe is one of our core contributions. We
show that applying the tools developed by Varian (1982) to recover the preferences of a
3We declare a bundle x revealed preferred to y whenever x is chosen when y is affordable.
4WARP states that, for any pair of observations xt and xs, when a consumer chooses xt with xs being
affordable, then, when she chooses xs, it must be that xt is more expensive.
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consumer that satisfies WGARP, but who fails GARP, may be ineffective. Formally, the
bounds provided for preferences using the toolkit in Varian (1982) for these cases may
provide uninformative bounds on preferences. Thus, the revealed-preference theory for
WGARP developed herein is not a corollary of the one for GARP. Specifically, we provide
in Theorem 3 such new informative bounds based on the notion of maximin rationalization
for data sets consistent with WGARP. Our key innovation is to consider subsets of OT ,
consisting of pairs of observations, where we can apply Varian’s tools to recover local
preferences that are combined to get bounds on the true global preferences.
In addition, we clarify the reasons behind the failure of Varian’s approach to recover
preferences. In fact, WGARP alone cannot ensure that every possible commodity bundle
x ∈ X can be supported, by some price, as the maximizer of a (maximin) preference
function. Varian’s approach implicitly assumes this condition, which holds only when
GARP holds.
In Figure 1, we observe an instance of this problem. There are three commodity
bundles, depicted as budget shares, (xt for t = {1, 2, 3}, with L = 3 goods), which satisfy
WGARP, but not GARP.5 Then, we consider an out-of-sample bundle (xT+1). We note
that the new bundle cannot be chosen, under any price, if the consumer remains consistent
with WGARP (i.e., WGARP fails in the extended data set OT ∪ {pT+1, xT+1} for all
possible prices). The reason is that all bundles in OT are strictly and directly revealed
preferred to xT+1. This is a consequence of xT+1 being affordable at the prices at which
the original commodity bundles were chosen. Nonetheless, for every possible price, xT+1
is revealed preferred to at least one of the original commodity bundles.6 If we apply
Varian’s tools to this simple example, we cannot reject the hypothesis that xT+1 is the
worst possible bundle in X. But that would be an absurd conclusion, since it dominates
bundles such as 0.
As for item (iii), the question about counterfactual bounds on demand turns out to have
a simple answer. In fact, the answers for WGARP and GARP are analogous. We can build
counterfactual bounds for demand consistent with WGARP with a direct modification of
the approach by Varian (1982). Evidently, WGARP is a weaker condition than GARP,
and provides less informative bounds to demand for a new price. At the same time, such
bounds are easier to compute, and possibly more robust, in that they require only local
consistency. We provide Afriat-like inequalities for WGARP that facilitate testing this
condition using modern linear/integer programming techniques. These inequalities seem
to be new to the literature.
In contrast to item (iii), item (iv) –i.e., the question concerning shape constraints on
the preference function– has an answer that is remarkably different from the classical
work by Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982). In fact, we observe that convexity of preferences
5Each arrow represents a direct revealed-preference relation, where the commodity at the origin is
directly revealed preferred to the commodity at the end of the arrow.
6The formal details of this figure are expanded in Example 1.
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Figure 1 – WGARP is satisfied but GARP fails
is a testable shape constraint in finite data sets: there are data sets satisfying WGARP
that cannot be rationalized by preference functions that are quasiconcave in the first
argument. This means that these data sets cannot be rationalized by convex preferences.7
This finding provides a counterexample to Samuelson’s eternal darkness, which refers to
the impossibility of testing convexity of preferences in the case of utility maximization.
(Incidentally, the lack of convexity of some preference functions is precisely the reason that
recovering preferences can no longer use the tools in Varian (1982).) Congruent with our
analysis, John (2001) provides necessary and sufficient conditions for quasiconcavity of
the preference function. And following Brown and Calsamiglia 2007; Allen and Rehbeck
2018, we next focus on the study of a quasilinear restriction on the local utilities in the
maximin preference function representation, and show in Theorem 4 that this restriction
is associated with the law of demand. This characterization may be of interest in its
own right, due to the importance of the law of demand in both theoretical and applied
literatures.
The direct predecessors of our work are the contributions of Kim and Richter (1986)
and Quah (2006). Both works provide rationalizations of demand correspondences
(or functions) consistent with WGARP (or WARP) with additional conditions on the
invertibility of demand. The current work generalizes their results in two respects: (i) it
provides a rationalization of WGARP/WARP for finite data sets, and (ii) for the case of
infinite data sets, it relaxes a key invertibility assumption in both papers, i.e., we do not
require that the set of prices at which any commodity bundle be chosen is nonempty.
7Informally, we say that preferences are convex if the set of commodities preferred to x, Ur(x), is
convex.
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This paper’s findings should be helpful for practitioners of revealed preferences since,
from an empirical perspective, WGARP is significantly easier to work with than Varian’s
GARP. In applications, it is common for practitioners to use WGARP as a synonymous
of GARP. However, this is only true if price variation is limited, as shown in Cherchye
et al. (2018). For example, it may happen that a finite data set of prices and observed
consumption choices is consistent with WGARP, but cannot be rationalized by a utility
function. If this occurs, the interpretation of the direct revealed-preference relation is
unclear, yet we show that meaningful welfare analysis is possible.
The plan of the paper is as follows. After the central notions of revealed-preference
theory are reviewed in section 2, sections 3 to 6 deal in turn with the questions posed
on items (i) to (iv) discussed above. Section 7 extends the analysis to infinite data sets.
Section 8 is a brief review of related literature, and section 9 concludes. Proofs are
collected in an appendix.
2. Preliminaries
Suppose that a consumer chooses bundles consisting of L ≥ 2 goods in a market. We
assume that we have access to a finite number of observations, denoted by T , on the prices
and chosen quantities of these goods, where observations are indexed by T = {1, . . . , T}.
Let xt ∈ X ≡ RL+ \ {0} denote the bundle of goods at time t ∈ T, which was bought at
prices pt ∈ P ≡ RL++. We impose Walras’ law throughout: wealth at time t is equivalent
to ptxt ∈ W ≡ R++, for all t ∈ T.8 We write OT = {pt, xt}t∈T to denote all price-quantity
observations, and refer to OT as the data. In practice, the data OT describe a single
consumer that is observed over time.
2.1. Revealed-Preference Axioms
We begin by recalling some key definitions in the revealed-preference literature.
Definition 1. (Direct revealed preferred relations) We say that xt is directly revealed
preferred to xs, written xt R,D xs, when ptxt ≥ ptxs. Also, xt is strictly and directly
revealed preferred to xs, written xt R,D xs, when ptxt > ptxs.
If xt is directly revealed preferred to xs, this means that the consumer chose xt and not
xs, when both bundles were affordable. If xt is strictly and directly revealed preferred to
8We use the following notation: The inner product of two vectors x, y ∈ RL is defined as xy = ∑Ll=1 xlyl.
For all (x, y) ∈ RL, x = y if xi ≥ yi for all i = 1, . . . , L; x ≥ y if x = y and x 6= y; and x > y if xi > yi
for all i = 1, . . . , L. We denote RL+ = {x ∈ RL : x = (0, . . . , 0)} and RL++ = {x ∈ RL : x > (0, . . . , 0)}.
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xs, then she could also have saved money by choosing xs. These definitions only compare
pairs of bundles. We can extend them to compare any subset of bundles by using the
transitive closure of the direct relation:
Definition 2. (Revealed preferred relations) We say that xt is revealed preferred to xs,
written xt R xs, when there is a chain (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ T with x1 = xt and xn = xs such
that x1 R,D x2 R,D . . . R,D xn. Also, xt is strictly revealed preferred to xs, written
xt R xs, when at least one of the directly revealed relations in the revealed preferred chain
is strict.
Hence, the revealed preferred relation R is the transitive closure of the direct revealed-
preference relation R,D. Next, we use these binary relations to define axioms that
characterize different types of rational consumer behavior. We begin with Samuelson’s
(1938) weak axiom of revealed preference:
Axiom 1. (WARP) The weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) holds if there is no
pair of observations s, t ∈ T such that xt R,D xs, and xs R,D xt, with xt 6= xs.
Kihlstrom et al. (1976) introduces a generalized version of WARP:9
Axiom 2. (WGARP) The weak generalized axiom of revealed preference (WGARP) holds
if there is no pair of observations s, t ∈ T such that xt R,D xs, and xs R,D xt.
Samuelson (1948) shows how WARP can be used to construct a set of indifference
curves in the two-dimensional (L = 2) case, but also recognizes that WARP is not enough
to characterize rationality in the multi-dimensional (L > 2) case. Responding to this
challenge, Houthakker (1950) introduces the strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP),
which makes use of transitive comparisons between bundles as implied by the revealed
preferred relation:
Axiom 3. (SARP) The strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP) holds if there is no
pair of observations s, t ∈ T such that xt R xs, and xs R,D xt, with xt 6= xs.
Varian (1982) notes that SARP requires single-valued demand functions, and argues
that it is empirically more convenient to work with demand correspondences and “flat”
indifference curves. To accomodate these properties, Varian introduces the generalized
axiom of revealed preference (GARP):
Axiom 4. (GARP) The generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) holds if there
is no pair of observations s, t ∈ T such that xt R xs and xs R,D xt.
9In contrast to only observing a finite number of prices and quantities, suppose that we knew the entire
demand function. In this case, Kihlstrom et al. (1976) shows that if the demand function is differentiable
and satisfies WGARP at every point in its domain, then the Slutsky substitution matrix derived from the
demand function is negative semidefinite at every point.
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In the two-dimensional (L = 2) case, the following equivalences are known:
Theorem A. (Equivalence of axioms) Let L = 2. Consider a finite data set OT =
{pt, xt}t∈T:
• The data OT satisfies SARP if and only if OT satisfies WARP (Rose 1958).
• The data OT satisfies GARP if and only if OT satisfies WGARP (Banerjee and
Murphy 2006).
2.2. Revealed-Preference Characterizations
In this section, we recall the main results from the revealed-preference literature that
are needed in order to introduce our contribution. Consider the following definitions of
rationalization:10
Definition 3. (Utility rationalization) Consider a data set OT = {pt, xt}t∈T and a utility
function u : X 7→ R. For all x ∈ X and all t ∈ T such that ptx ≤ ptxt,
• the data OT is weakly rationalized by u if u(xt) ≥ u(x).
• the data OT is strictly rationalized by u if u(xt) > u(x) whenever x 6= xt.
Afriat’s (1967) fundamental theorem is well known:
Theorem B. (Afriat’s theorem, Varian 1982) Consider a finite data set OT = {pt, xt}t∈T.
The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The data OT can be weakly rationalized by a locally nonsatiated utility function.
(ii) The data OT satisfies GARP.
(iii) There exist numbers U t and λt > 0 for all t ∈ T such that the Afriat inequalities:
U t − U s ≥ λtpt(xt − xs),
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
10We say that a utility function u : X 7→ R is: (i) continuous if for any sequence (xn) for n ∈ N+ such
that xn ∈ X and limn→∞ xn = x with x ∈ X implies limn→∞ u(xn) = u(x); (ii) locally nonsatiated if for
any x ∈ X and for any  > 0, there exists y ∈ B(x, ) where B(x, ) = {z ∈ X : | ||z − x|| ≤ } such
that u(y) > u(x); (iii) strictly incresing if for x, y ∈ X, x ≥ y implies u(x) > u(y); and (iv) concave if for
any x, y ∈ X, we have u(x)− u(y) ≥ ξ (y − x), for ξ ∈ ∂u(y), where ∂u(y) is the subdifferential of u.
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(iv) There exist numbers V t for all t ∈ T such that the Varian inequalities:
if pt(xt − xs) ≥ 0 then, V t − V s ≥ 0,
if pt(xt − xs) > 0 then, V t − V s > 0,
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(v) The data OT can be weakly rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing, and
concave utility function.
There are several interesting features of Afriat’s theorem.11 Statements (ii), (iii), and
(iv) give testable conditions that are easy to implement in practice (See, e.g., Demuynck and
Hjertstrand 2019). Perhaps the most interesting theoretical implication of Afriat’s theorem
is that statements (i) and (v) are equivalent, which means that continuity, monotonicity,
and concavity are nontestable properties. In other words, separate violations of any of
these properties cannot be detected in finite data sets.
Varian (1982) shows that the numbers U t and λt in statement (iii) can be interpreted
as measures of the utility level and marginal utility level of income at observation t ∈ T.
Analogously, Demuynck and Hjertstrand (2019) shows that the numbers V t in statement
(iv) can be interpreted as measures of the utility levels at the observed demands.
Matzkin and Richter (1991) provides an analogous result for strict rationalization, by
showing that SARP is a necessary and sufficient condition for a data set OT to be strictly
rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave utility function:
Theorem C. (Matzkin and Richter 1991) Consider a finite data set OT = {pt, xt}t∈T.
The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The data OT can be strictly rationalized by a locally nonsatiated utility function.
(ii) The data OT satisfies SARP.
(iii) There exist numbers U t and λt > 0 for all t ∈ T such that the inequalities
if xt 6= xs then, U t − U s > λtpt
(
xt − xs
)
,
if xt = xs then, U t − U s = 0,
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(iv) There exist numbers V t for all t ∈ T such that the inequalities:
if xt 6= xs and pt(xt − xs) ≥ 0 then, V t − V s > 0,
11Statements (i), (ii), (iii), and (v) comprise Varian’s (1982) original formulation of Afriat’s theorem.
Statement (iv) is rather new to the revealed preference literature. See Demuynck and Hjertstrand (2019)
for a motivation and intuition of the Varian inequalities in statement (iv).
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if xt = xs then, V t − V s = 0,
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(v) The data OT can be strictly rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing and
strictly concave utility function.
Matzkin and Richter’s (1991) theorem mirrors Afriat’s, in the sense that it shows
that continuity, monotonicity, and strict concavity are nontestable properties.12 Although
much is known about the types of consumer behavior that characterize finite data sets
satisfying SARP and GARP, there are no analogous characterizations for WARP and
WGARP. The current paper, starting with the next section, fills this gap.
3. Characterizations of WGARP and WARP
In this section, we provide revealed-preference characterizations, analogous to the ones
in Afriat’s and Matzkin and Richter’s theorems, for WGARP and WARP. We begin by
introducing the maximin preference model, which, to the best of our knowledge, is a new
model of consumer behavior.
3.1. The Maximin Preference Model
We start with some preliminaries.
Definition 4. (Preference function) A preference function is a mapping r : X ×X → R,
that maps ordered pairs of commodity bundles to real numbers.
A preference function is a numerical representation of a consumer’s preferences. If
r(x, y) ≥ 0 then the consumer prefers bundle x to y. Similarly, if r(x, y) > 0, we say that
x is strictly preferred to y.
In what follows, we focus on a particular representation of r, namely the maximin
model. Let U be a finite index set that enumerates a collection of reference points.
We define a reference point as a pair of observations, consisting of two price vectors
and the corresponding vectors of commodity bundles ((pi, xi), (pj, xj)) ∈ (P × X)2 for
i, j ∈ U . We consider a collection of reference-dependent utility functions uij : X → R,
with the property that if pixi ≥ (>)piy for all y ∈ X, then it must be the case that
12Matzkin and Richter’s (1991) original formulation consists of statements (i), (ii), (iii), and (v).
Talla Nobibon et al. (2016) proves the equivalence of statements (ii) and (iv).
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uij(xi) ≥ (>)uij(y), for all i, j ∈ U . We assume that the reference-dependent utility
functions are independent of permutations of the indices in the subscript, so that uij = uji
for all i, j ∈ U . Let ∆(U) be the probability simplex defined on U .
Definition 5. (Maximin (strict) preference model) We say that the preference function
r(x, y) is a maximin (strict) preference function if, for any x, y ∈ X, it can be written as:
r(x, y) = max
µ∈∆(U)
min
λ∈∆(U)
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈U
λiµj(uij(x)− uij(y)),
where, for any reference point indexed by i, j ∈ U , the ’local’ utility function, uij, is
continuous, strictly increasing, and (strictly) concave.
The maximin preference function assigns a numerical value to the comparison of any
pair of commodity bundles x, y ∈ X, by aggregating over local preferences that are defined
for any reference point in the set U . More specifically, the aggregation is a maximin
function, which in the first dimension takes the maximal difference between the utility
gains of x over y, and in the second dimension, takes the minimal value of that difference,
over the different ’local’ utility functions.
The maximin aggregation structure is appealing because the preference function
effectively extends the incomplete direct revealed preference relation when it is asymmetric
(i.e., when WGARP holds) to the commodity space X. As such, this representation
provides us with an interpretation of the direct revealed preference relation when rationality
–GARP– fails, but WGARP is satisfied.
For any reference point indexed by i, j ∈ U , the local utility function, uij , is continuous,
strictly increasing, and (strictly) concave. Moreover, the maximin is achieved at a particular
reference point. Thus, for any pairwise comparison, a consumer behaves as if they are
rational. However, note from the definition of uij that, for any distinct pairwise comparison
that is not a permutation, the preferences may change, in which case, preferences are not
stable across all observations. In the maximin (strict) preference model, a consumer still
behaves locally “as if she were rational” in that behavior according to this model rules
out binary inconsistencies. More precisely, we show that a data set OT satisfies (WARP)
WGARP if and only if the maximin (strict) preference model (strictly) rationalizes the
data.
As a special case, when all local utility functions are the same, i.e., uij = u for all
i, j ∈ U , the maximin preference model reduces to standard utility maximization. Then,
r(x, y) = u(x)− u(y) for all x, y ∈ X. As such, traditional utility maximization is a case
of global rationality, as opposed to the new notion of local rationality introduced here.
Next, we present some properties of the preference function. We begin with a property
that turns out to be key in our characterizations of WARP and WGARP:
Definition 6. (Skew-symmetry) We say that a preference function r : X × X 7→ R is
skew-symmetric if r(x, y) = −r(y, x) for all x, y ∈ X.
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Skew-symmetry means that the preference function r induces a preference order on
X that is complete and asymmetric. Note that, when a data OT satisfies WGARP, then
the direct preference relation is an (incomplete) asymmetric relation on X, the preference
function r extends it if it is a maximin function. We have the following result:
Lemma 1. If r is a maximin preference function, then for any x, y ∈ X, we have:
r(x, y) = max
µ∈∆(U)
min
λ∈∆(U)
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈U
λiµj(uij(x)− uij(y))
= min
λ∈∆(U)
max
µ∈∆(U)
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈U
λiµj(uij(x)− uij(y)),
and moreover, r is skew-symmetric.
The proof of this lemma is omitted, as it follows directly from the classical von
Neumann’s minimax theorem. It is easy to see that the maximin preference function
is skew-symmetric, making this model a variant of the general nontransitive consumer
model, considered in Shafer (1974).
The next definition lists some additional important properties of preference functions,
which will connect with the maximin preference model in the following section:
Definition 7. Consider a preference function r : X ×X → R. We say that:
(i) r is continuous if for all y ∈ X and any sequence {xn} of elements in X that
converges to x ∈ X it must be that limn→∞ r (xn, y) = r (x, y).13
(ii) r is locally nonsatiated if for any x, y ∈ X such that r (x, y) = 0 and for any  > 0,
there exists a y′ ∈ B(y, ) such that r (x, y′) < 0.
(iii) r is strictly increasing if for all x, y, z ∈ X, x ≥ z implies r(x, y) > r(z, y).
(iv) r is quasiconcave if for all x, y, z ∈ X and any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 we have r
(
xλ, y
)
≥
min {r (x, y) , r (z, y)}, where xλ = λx+ (1− λ) z, and strictly quasiconcave if, for
any 0 < λ < 1, the inequality is strict whenever x 6= z.
(v) r is concave if for all x, y, z ∈ X and any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 we have r
(
xλ, y
)
≥ λr (x, y) +
(1− λ) r (z, y), and strictly concave if, for any 0 < λ < 1, the inequality is strict
whenever x 6= z.
(vi) r is piecewise concave if there is a sequence of concave functions in the first argument
ft (x, y) for t ∈ K in a compact set such that r (x, y) = maxt∈K {ft (x, y)}, and
strictly piecewise concave if there is a similar sequence of strictly concave functions.
13We state the weaker versions of these properties, as all we need is to work with movements in one of
the arguments.
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Some remarks are in order: Continuity is a technical condition that is convenient
to ensure existence of a maximum in the constrained maximization of the preference
function. Local nonsatiation rules out thick indifference curves: if we take an arbitrarily
small neighborhood of a bundle that is indifferent to a given bundle x, the neighborhood
contains bundles that are dominated by x. Strict monotonicity simply means that "more
is better". Quasiconcavity says that for a fixed reference point y ∈ X, a mixture of two
bundles x, z ∈ X is at least as good as the worst of the two bundles, according to the
preference function. Concavity is a cardinal version of quasiconcavity. Quasiconcavity
and concavity are important properties because they ensure well-behaved optimization
problems. More precisely, quasiconcavity guarantees that a function defined on a compact
set has a convex set of maxima points, while a strictly concave function defined on a
compact set always has a unique global maximum.
Piecewise concavity and its strict version are new properties, which turn out to be
especially important for our characterizations of WGARP/WARP.14 The property says
that for a fixed y ∈ X, a mixture of two bundles x, z ∈ X is at least as good as the worst
one of the two bundles, but only if x, z are close enough. In other words, this is a local
version of concavity, implying local quasiconcavity.
3.2. Preference Function Rationalization
We now introduce the notion of (strict) rationalization by a preference function, which
is analogous to utility rationalization in Definition 3:
Definition 8. (Preference function rationalization) Consider a data set OT = {pt, xt}t∈T
and a preference function r : X × X 7→ R. For all x ∈ X and all t ∈ T such that
ptx ≤ ptxt,
• the data OT is weakly rationalized by r if r(xt, x) ≥ 0.
• the data OT is strictly rationalized by r if r(xt, x) > 0 whenever x 6= xt.
The next definition introduces the concept of rationalization in terms of the maximin
preference model:
Definition 9. (Maximin preference rationalization) The data OT is weakly (strictly)
rationalized by a maximin (strict maximin) preference function r if r is a maximin
(strict maximin) preference function as stated in Definition 5, and OT is weakly (strictly)
rationalized by r as stated in Definition 8.
In the subsequent two sections, we show that WGARP (WARP) is a necessary and
sufficient condition for a data set OT to be rationalized by the maximin (strict maximin)
preference model.
14See Zangwill (1967) for a detailed discussion of piecewise concave functions.
14
3.3. WGARP
The next theorem provides a revealed-preference characterization of WGARP for
finite data sets. This result mirrors Afriat’s theorem in terms of preference function
rationalization (as opposed to utility rationalization):
Theorem 1. Consider a finite data set OT = {pt, xt}t∈T. The following statements are
equivalent:
(i) The data OT can be weakly rationalized by a locally nonsatiated and skew-symmetric
preference function.
(ii) The data OT satisfies WGARP.
(iii) There exist numbers Rt,s and λtts > 0 for all s, t ∈ T with Rt,s = −Rs,t and λtts = λtst
such that inequalities:
Rt,s ≥ λttspt(xt − xs),
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(iv) There exist numbers W t,s for all s, t ∈ T with W t,s = −W s,t such that inequalities:
if pt(xt − xs) ≥ 0 then, W t,s ≥ 0,
if pt(xt − xs) > 0 then, W t,s > 0,
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(v) The data OT can be weakly rationalized by a maximin preference function.
(vi) The data OT can be weakly rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing, piecewise
concave, and skew-symmetric preference function.
The equivalence of statements (i) and (vi) shows that, if the data can be weakly
rationalized by any nontrivial preference function at all, it can, in fact, be weakly
rationalized by a preference function that satisfies continuity, monotonicity, and piecewise
concavity. Put differently, separate violations of these three properties cannot be detected
in finite data sets.
The numbers Rt,s and λtst in statement (iii) have a similar interpretation as in Afriat’s
theorem for each reference point; that is, if we consider t, s ∈ T, then Rt,s is a measure of
the utility difference uts(xt)− uts(xs) for that particular pairwise data set, while λtst is a
measure of the marginal utility level of income at observation t ∈ T for the pairwise data
set.
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3.4. WARP
The next theorem provides a revealed-preference characterization of WARP for finite
data sets, and mirrors Matzkin and Richter’s (1991) theorem:
Theorem 2. Consider a finite data set OT = {pt, xt}t∈T. The following statements are
equivalent:
(i) The data OT can be strictly rationalized by a locally nonsatiated and skew-symmetric
preference function.
(ii) The data OT satisfies WARP.
(iii) There exist numbers Rt,s and λtts > 0 for all s, t ∈ T with Rt,s = −Rs,t and λtts = λtst
such that inequalities:
if xt 6= xs then, Rt,s > λttspt
(
xt − xs
)
,
if xt = xs then, Rt,s = 0,
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(iv) There exist numbers W t,s for all s, t ∈ T with W t,s = −W s,t such that inequalities:
if xt 6= xs and pt(xt − xs) ≥ 0 then, W t,s > 0,
if xt = xs then, W t,s = 0,
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(v) The data OT can be strictly rationalized by a maximin strict preference function.
(vi) The data OT can be strictly rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing, piecewise
strictly concave, and skew-symmetric preference function.
Analogous to Theorem 1, this result shows that separate violations of continuity,
monotonicity, and strict piecewise concavity cannot be detected in finite data sets.
4. Recoverability of Preferences
In this section, we tackle the question of when one can use the direct revealed-preference
relation elicited from the observed consumer behavior in order to make inferences about
her true preferences. We begin by showing that recovering preferences using WGARP
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does not follow as a trivial corollary of the original approach proposed by Varian (1982).
We next propose an alternative method to recover bounds of preferences using WGARP.
4.1. Varian’s Approach to Recover Bounds on Preferences Using WGARP
At this point, it is useful to briefly recall the classical approach from Varian (1982),
which finds upper and lower bounds to the true preferences of a consumer. The object of
interest is the true preference of the consumer, captured by the strict upper contour set
of a commodity bundle x according to the true preference function r:
Definition 10. (Set of strictly better alternatives) We define the set of strictly better
alternatives than a (possibly unobserved) commodity bundle x ∈ X as:
Ur(x) = {y ∈ X : r(y, x) > 0},
for the true preference function r.
Varian (1982) defines the supporting set of prices for any new commodity bundle
x ∈ X so that the extended data set, OT ∪ {p, x}, satisfies GARP as:
S(x) = {p ∈ P : OT ∪ {p, x} satisfies GARP}.
Varian then uses the set S(x) to create upper and lower bounds for the set of interest
Ur(x). We need to define two new sets. The revealed worse set is
RW (x) = {y ∈ X : ∀p ∈ S(x), x R,DOT∪{(p,x)} y}
for R,D, defined on the extended data set OT ∪ {(p, x)}. The nonrevealed worse set
NRW (x) is the complement of RW (x). The revealed preferred set is
RP (x) = {y ∈ X : ∀p ∈ S(y), y R,DOT∪{(p,y)} x}.
Varian (1982) shows that, in the case of utility maximization (i.e., r(x, y) = u(x)− u(y)),
for some u : X → R and all x, y ∈ X) we have:
RP (x) ⊆ Ur(x) ⊆ NRW (x).
One would be tempted to use the same construction for WGARP by replacing the definition
of the supporting set S(x) with one where the extended data set satisfies WGARP. Of
course, when the data consists of two goods (i.e., L = 2), this does not cause any problems
since, in such a case, WGARP and GARP are equivalent (See Theorem A). However, if
L > 2, as we show, performing such an exercise is generally not advisable. In particular,
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we illustrate this by means of an example that, in some cases, yields an uninformative
upper bound set NRW (x).
We begin the elaboration of these points by using an example in Keiding and Tvede
(2013):
Example 1. (Keiding and Tvede 2013, Example 1, p.467) Consider a data set O3 with
prices p1 = (4 1 5)′, p2 = (5 4 1)′, p3 = (1 5 4)′, and bundles x1 = (4 1 1)′, x2 = (1 4 1)′,
x3 = (1 1 4)′. It is easy to verify that this data set satisfies WGARP. The objective is to
recover the preferences of this consumer for a new commodity bundle, xT+1, given this
observed behavior. Suppose that the unobserved commodity bundle is:
xT+1 = 13(x
1 + x2 + x3) = (2 2 2)′.
If the analyst were to use the methods in Varian (1982), she would need to recover all
prices pT+1 for which the extended data set O3 ∪ (pT+1, xT+1) satisfies WGARP. In this
extended data set, we have pt(xt − xT+1) = 2 > 0, for all t = 1, 2, 3. However, there is
no p ∈ P for which p(xT+1 − xt) < 0, for all t = 1, 2, 3. This implies that this extended
data set fails WGARP. This presents a problem, if we want to recover preferences using
Varian’s (1982) approach, because it implicitly assumes that the analyst can always find at
least one such vector of prices.
In this example, Varian’s supporting set is empty, i.e., S(xT+1) = ∅. Moreover, it
directly follows that any monotonically dominated bundle such as x− = (1 1 1) cannot be
ruled out from the set Ur(x). Consequently, the upper bound of Ur(xT+1) is uninformative,
i.e., NRW (xT+1) = X \ xT+1. Thus, any analysis based on this approach is problematic,
since the data set O3 can be rationalized by a preference function that is strictly increasing
(in the first argument). In other words, Varian’s method to bound preferences does not
yield any valuable information in this example.
Yet the method proposed by Varian (1982) to recover preferences for GARP is often
useful. Our analysis simply says that recoverability of preferences in terms of WGARP
does not follow as a trivial corollary of Varian’s results. We can also clarify the source of
this failure. Consider Example 1 again, and note that the original data satisfies WGARP,
which implies that there is a preference function r that rationalizes the data. Moreover,
we have that r(x1, x2) > 0, r(x2, x3) > 0, and r(x3, x1) > 0. In addition, we know that the
new bundle, xT+1, is a convex combination of the observed bundles. Given the equivalence
between GARP and convexity of preferences, if we followed Varian’s approach then we
would be implicitly assuming that preferences are convex. But, in our case, convexity of
preferences is implied by the assumption that the preference function is quasiconcave in its
first argument, in which case, we must have r(xT+1, xT+1) = 0 ≥ mint=1,2,3{r(xt, xT+1)}.
This implies that xT+1 must be revealed to be weakly better than at least one of the
three observed bundles x1, x2, and x3. However, note that, for all t = 1, 2, 3, we have
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pt(xt − xT+1) = 2 > 0. This implies that, if the consumer is maximizing a quasiconcave
preference function, then all observed commodity bundles must be strictly preferred to
the new bundle, i.e., r(xt, xT+1) > 0 for all t = 1, 2, 3. Hence, the extended data set
O3 ∪ {p, xT+1} cannot be weakly rationalized by a quasiconcave and skew-symmetric
preference function.
Interestingly, this example also shows that quasiconcavity of the preference function is,
in fact, a testable property in finite data sets. As such, this is also a counterexample to
Samuelson’s eternal darkness conjecture, that any finite data set always can be rationalized
by a convex preference relation. Summarizing these results, the lack of convexity of
preferences, which can be inferred from behavior consistent with WGARP, limits the
applicability of the tools developed in the classical treatment by Varian (1982). In section
6.1, we will return to the study of the testable implications of convexity.
4.2. A New Approach to Recover Bounds on Preferences Using WGARP
In this subsection, we use the new notion of maximin preference rationalization as a
way to provide new informative bounds of the true preferences. We show that these new
bounds escape the problems associated with Varian’s approach.
We have shown, in the proof of Theorem 1, that, without loss of generality, we can
identify the index set of reference point situations U with the set of observations T, so that
we have a local true utility us,t for all s, t ∈ T, in which case the true global preferences
for any x′, x ∈ X are given by:
r(x′, x) = max
µ∈∆(T)
min
λ∈∆(T)
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈T
λsµt(ust(x′)− ust(x)).
We have also shown that any data set OT satisfying WGARP can be broken into T 2
pairwise data sets O2st = {(pt, xt), (ps, xs)}, and have argued that each one of these data
sets satisfies GARP. Define the ’local’ (Varian) support set as Sst(x) for any x ∈ X. For a
data set of T observations, note that we have a collection of T 2 such ’local’ support sets,
and that everyone of these sets is never empty:
Definition 11. (WGARP-robust revealed preferred set) For each s, t ∈ T let
RPst(x) = {y ∈ X : ∀p ∈ Sst(y), py > px}
be the pairwise revealed preferred set. We define the (WGARP-)robust revealed preferred
set as:
RPW (x) = ∪s∈T ∩t∈T RPst(x).
Next, we argue that the robust revealed preferred set is a lower bound of Ur(x) for
all x ∈ X. If x′ ∈ RPW (x), this implies that x′ ∈ RPst(x) for all t ∈ T and for some
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s∗ ∈ T. Thus, it must be the case that, for s∗ and for all t ∈ T, us∗t(x′) > us∗t(x). This
means that r(x′, x) ≥ minµ∑t µt(us∗t(x′)− us∗t(x)) > 0. Hence, we can conclude that, if
x′ ∈ RPW (x), then r(x′, x) > 0, which is the same as saying that RPW (x) ⊆ Ur(x).
Definition 12. (WGARP-robust (non)revealed worse set) For each s, t ∈ T, let
RWst(x) = {y ∈ X : ∀p ∈ Sst(x), px > py}
be the pairwise revealed worse set. Let NRWst(x) be the complement of RWst(x). We
define the (WGARP-)robust nonrevealed worse set as
NRWW (x) = ∩s∈T ∪t∈T NRWst(x).
From this definition, it directly follows that, if r(x′, x) > 0, then x′ ∈ NRWW (x).
To see this, note that, if r(x′, x) > 0, then there must be some t∗ ∈ T such that
ust∗(x′) > ust∗(x) for all s ∈ T. This implies, by Varian 1982, that x′ ∈ NRWst∗(x) for all
s ∈ T. By Definition 12, we must have that x′ ∈ NRWW (x). Hence, we can conclude
that Ur(x) ⊆ NRWW (x). The following theorem summarizes these results, confirming
that the bounds recovered using Varian’s approach in this context are not sharp:
Theorem 3. The upper contour set of the true preferences at any given x ∈ X is:
RPW (x) ⊆ Ur(x) ⊆ NRWW (x).
Moreover, (i) the upper bound, NRW (x), recovered using Varian’s approach is not sharp,
i.e., NRWW (x) ⊆ NRW (x) for all x ∈ X (with strict containment for some x ∈ X);
and (ii) the lower bound, RP (x), recovered using Varian’s approach is not sharp, i.e.,
RP (x) ⊆ RPW (x) for all x ∈ X (with strict containment for some x ∈ X).
We note that, in the context of Example 1, NRWW (xT+1) does not contain the
dominated commodity x− = (1 1 1). In fact, NRWW (xT+1) excludes all commodity
bundles that are monotonically dominated by xT+1, which is a desirable property, lacking
in Varian’s analogous set NRW (xT+1) = X \xT+1. Similar statements can be made about
the RPW (x−) set.
Theorem 3 has some important implications. The first part shows that the new method
of using subsets of data sets for bound computation yields informative bounds. The
second part highlights that a naive application of the methodology in Varian (1982), when
the assumption of convex preferences does not hold, is problematic.
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5. Demand Counterfactuals
In this section, we show how to perform counterfactual analysis. That is, for a new
(possibly unobserved) price vector pT+1 we propose a simple method to provide a bound
for the demanded bundle under WGARP. This method is a simplification of the procedure
for the same purpose under GARP, proposed by Varian (1982).
Definition 13. (W-Demand Set) We define the W-demand set, or the set of all commodity
bundles compatible with WGARP, by
D(pT+1) = {x ∈ X : OT ∪ {pT+1, x} satisfies WGARP and pT+1x = 1}.
The W-demand set for a new price-vector can be formulated as a linear program by
making use of the following result:
Corollary 1. The bundle xT+1 ∈ X is in D(pT+1) if and only if it satisfies:
(i) pT+1xT+1 = 1,
(ii) ptxT+1 ≥ ptxt, for all t ∈ T, for which pT+1xt ≤ pT+1xT+1,
(iii) ptxT+1 > ptxt, for all t ∈ T, for which pT+1xt < pT+1xT+1.
The first condition is a normalization of wealth and imposes Walras’ law. The second
condition imposes the restriction that, if the observed bundles are cheaper than the new
bundle at the new prices, then the new bundle cannot be affordable at the observed prices.
The third condition strengthens the second, for the case of a strict inequality. Note that,
if the new bundle is cheaper at the new prices than the observed bundles, then the second
and third conditions are redundant as WGARP is trivially satisfied for the extended data
set.
Recently, Adams (2019) highlights some technical difficulties in the construction of the
W-demand set, when predictions are made at more than a single price regime. For that
case, Adams (2019) proposes a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem, which
can be simplified for the case of WGARP using the results in Theorem 1. In particular,
the inequalities in statement (iv) of Theorem 1 are useful for this purpose.
Cherchye et al. (2015) shows how the Varian inequalities in statement (iv) in Theorem B
can be formulated as a MILP problem. This MILP problem can be modified in a
straightforward way to check whether the inequalities in statement (iv) in Theorem 1
have a solution. Specifically, it follows from Theorem 4 in Cherchye et al. (2015) that
statement (iv) in our Theorem 1 holds if and only if there exist numbers Rt,s ∈ (−1, 1),
with Rt,s = −Rs,t, and binary variables Bt,s ∈ {0, 1} such that, for all observations s, t ∈ T,
the following linear inequalities (in p and x) hold:
Rt,s < Bt,s,
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(Bt,s − 1) ≤ Rt,s,
pt(xt − xs) < Bt,sAt,
(Bt,s − 1)As ≤ ps(xt − xs).
As a final remark, in contrast to recoverability of preferences for data sets consistent
with WGARP, the construction of demand counterfactuals is just a simplification of the
procedure outlined in Varian (1982). The main reason is that the construction of the
W-demand set does not depend on duality arguments, which fail when quasiconcavity of
the preference function does not hold.
6. Shape Constraints: Concave Rationalization and the Law of
Demand
We have shown, in sections 3.3 and 3.4, that WGARP (WARP) is a necessary and
sufficient condition for a data set to be rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing,
skew-symmetric, and piecewise (strictly) concave preference function. In this section, we
consider conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a data set to be rationalized under
stronger shape restrictions.
6.1. Concave Rationalization
John (2001) provides conditions under which a data set can be weakly rationalized by
a continuous, strictly increasing, skew-symmetric, and concave preference function:
Theorem D. (John 2001) Consider a data set OT = {pt, xt}t∈T. The following statements
are equivalent:
(i) The data OT can be weakly rationalized by a locally nonsatiated, concave, and
skew-symmetric preference function.
(ii) There exist numbers Rt,s and λt > 0 for all s, t ∈ T with Rt,s = −Rs,t such that the
inequalities:
Rt,s ≥ λtpt(xt − xs),
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(iii) The data OT can be weakly rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing, concave,
and skew-symmetric preference function.
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John (2001) provides additional testable conditions, which he shows are equivalent
to condition (ii). By comparing John’s (2001) results with our Theorem 1, it is easy
to see that his results imply any of the conditions in our theorem, but not vice versa.
In particular, note that, in contrast to statement (iii) in Theorem 1, the indices λt are
constant across all pairs s, t ∈ T. This ensures that John’s rationalizing preference function
is indeed concave.
Of course, by Afriat’s theorem and the equivalence between WGARP and GARP (See
Theorem A), concavity is a nontestable property when L = 2. However, by Theorem 1
and Theorem D, when L > 2, concavity is a testable property. This raises the question of
whether it is at all possible to further strenghthen the results in Theorem 1, by showing
that WGARP is equivalent to weak rationalization by means of a quasiconcave preference
function. However, from the discussion in section 4.1, Example 1 shows that this is not
the case. In fact, this is a counterexample showing that the data cannot be rationalized by
a quasiconcave preference function. Thus, with a finite number of observations, Example 1
shows that quasiconcavity is a testable property.
6.2. The Law of Demand and Quasilinear Preference Functions
This subsection derives necessary and sufficient conditions for a data set to be ratio-
nalized by a continuous, strictly increasing, skew-symmetric, concave, and quasilinear
preference function. Interestingly, we show that one such condition is the law of demand,
and consequently, this is equivalent to rationalization by a maximin quasilinear prefer-
ence function. Before presenting these results, we briefly recall the revealed-preference
characterization for quasilinear-utility maximization.
6.2.a. The Quasilinear Utility Maximization Model.– First, we consider the definition of
quasilinear utility maximization:
Definition 14. (Quasilinear utility maximization) Consider a locally nonsatiated utility
function u(x). We say that a consumer facing prices p ∈ P and income w ∈ W is a
quasilinear utility maximizer if she solves
max
x∈X
u(x) + w − px ⇐⇒ max
x∈X,y∈R
u(x) + y s.t. px+ y ≤ w.
As in standard applications of quasilinear utility maximization, we allow the numeraire
y to be negative in order to avoid technicalities related to corner solutions.15 Consider
the following definition of quasilinear utility rationalization for a finite data set OT :
15Allen and Rehbeck (2018) shows the equivalence of the unconstrained quasilinear maximization and
the constrained version with a numeraire in Definition 14.
23
Definition 15. (Quasilinear utility rationalization) Consider a data set OT and a utility
function u : X → R. For all x ∈ X, the data OT is rationalized by a locally nonsatiated
and quasilinear utility function u if, for all t ∈ T:
u(xt)− ptxt ≥ u(x)− ptx.
Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) shows that the axiom of the strong law of demand is a
necessary and sufficient condition for a data set to be rationalized by a continuous, strictly
increasing, concave, and quasilinear utility function.16
Axiom 5. (Strong law of demand) The strong law of demand holds if, for all distinct
choices of indices (1, 2, 3, . . . , n) ∈ T:
p1(x1 − x2) + p2(x2 − x3) + · · ·+ pn(xn − x1) ≤ 0.
The next theorem recalls the revealed-preference characterization of quasilinear utility
maximization from Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) and Allen and Rehbeck (2018):
Theorem E. (Brown and Calsamiglia 2007; Allen and Rehbeck 2018) Consider a finite
data set OT = {pt, xt}t∈T. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The data OT can be rationalized by a locally nonsatiated and quasilinear utility
function.
(ii) The data OT satisfies the strong law of demand.
(iii) There exist numbers U t for all t ∈ T such that the inequalities:
U t − U s ≥ pt(xt − xs),
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(iv) The data OT can be rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing, concave, and
quasilinear utility function.
6.2.b. The Law of Demand and the Quasilinear Preference Function Maximization
Model.– In this subsection, we provide analogous results for the quasilinear preference
function model, and show that the law of demand is a necessary and sufficient condition for
a data set to be rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing, concave, skew-symmetric,
and quasilinear preference function. The axiom of the law of demand is formally defined
as:
16Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) refers to the strong law of demand as cyclical monotonicity, while
Geanakoplos (2013) calls it additive GARP (AGARP).
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Axiom 6. (Law of demand) The law of demand holds if, for all observations s, t ∈ T:
(pt − ps)(xt − xs) ≤ 0.
For any sequence consisting of only two (distinct) observations s, t ∈ T, it is easy to
see that the strong law of demand and the law of demand are equivalent. Thus, in a
sense, for the quasilinear model, the relation between the law of demand and the strong
law of demand mirrors the relation between WGARP (WARP) and GARP (SARP).
Before stating our revealed-preference characterization of the law of demand, we introduce
the maximin quasilinear preference function, which is a particular representation of a
quasilinear preference function:
Definition 16. (Maximin quasilinear preference model) We say that the preference func-
tion r(x, y) is a maximin quasilinear preference function if, for any x, y ∈ X, it can be
written as:
r(x, y) = max
µ∈∆(U)
min
λ∈∆(U)
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈U
λiµj(uij(x)− uij(y)),
where, for any reference point indexed by i, j ∈ U , the ’local’ utility function ui,j is
continuous, strictly increasing, concave, and quasilinear.
The next two definitions detail the notion of rationalization, in terms of the quasilinear
preference function, and in the specific case of the maximin quasilinear preference function
model:
Definition 17. (Quasilinear preference function rationalization) Consider a data set OT
and a preference function r : X ×X → R. For all x ∈ X and all t ∈ T, the data OT is
rationalized by a locally nonsatiated and quasilinear preference function r if
r(xt, x)− pt(xt − x) ≥ 0.
Definition 18 (Maximin quasilinear preference rationalization). The data OT is rational-
ized by a maximin quasilinear preference function r if r is a maximin quasilinear preference
function as stated in Definition 16, and OT is rationalized by a locally nonsatiated and
quasilinear preference function r as stated in Definition 17.
The next theorem provides a revealed-preference characterization of the law of demand
for finite data sets:
Theorem 4. Consider a finite data set OT = {pt, xt}t∈T. The following statements are
equivalent:
(i) The data OT can be rationalized by a locally nonsatiated, skew-symmetric, and
quasilinear preference function.
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(ii) The data OT satisfies the law of demand.
(iii) There exist numbers Rt,s, for all s, t ∈ T, with Rt,s = −Rs,t, such that inequalities:
Rt,s ≥ pt(xt − xs),
hold for all s, t ∈ T.
(iv) The data OT can be rationalized by a maximin quasilinear preference function.
(v) The data OT can be rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing, concave, skew-
symmetric, and quasilinear preference function.
7. Infinite Data Sets: Characterizations of WGARP, WARP and the
Law of Demand
Thus far, our results have been derived under the assumption that the researcher only
observes a finite number of choices. In the original formulation of revealed-preference
theory, Samuelson (1938) and Houthakker (1950) implicitly assume that the entire demand
function, or a demand correspondence, is observed. In this section, we show that our
main results from the previous sections can be transported to the case of infinite data
sets, namely, when we observe a demand correspondence x : P ×W → 2X \ ∅, where
w ∈ W ≡ R++ denotes wealth. We focus on compact sets of prices and consumption
bundles, where, by abusing notation slightly, we denote P ⊂ RL++ and X ⊂ RL+ \ 0, as the
sets of prices and consumption bundles, respectively. We continue to assume Walras’ law,
so that x ∈ x(p, w), px = w. We define the image of x as X = ∪p∈P,w∈Wx(p, w). A central
assumption throughout this section is that we can write the demand correspondence as
a data set consisting of an infinite number of demand observations, which we denote by
O∞ = {p, x}p∈P,x∈X:x∈x(p,px).
7.1. WGARP and WARP
We begin by providing revealed-preference characterizations for WGARP and WARP.
In doing so, we define the direct preference relations for infinite data sets as:
Definition 19. (Direct Revealed Preferences) We say that x ∈ X is directly revealed
preferred to y ∈ X, written x R,D y, when px ≥ py such that x ∈ x(p, px). Also, x ∈ X
is directly revealed preferred to y ∈ X, written x R,D y when px > py and x ∈ x(p, px).
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Under this definition, the data O∞ satisfies WGARP if there is no pair x, y ∈ X such
that x R,D y and y R,D x. Analogously, the data O∞ satisfies WARP if there is no pair
x, y ∈ X such that x R,D y and y R,D x.
We begin by generalizing the maximin rational preference function to the case of
infinite data sets. For this, we need some preliminaries. For any reference point in the
data set O∞, we rearrange the observations into a vector o = (p′ a′ q′ b′)′ ∈ O2, with
O ⊆ P ×X and x ∈ x(p, px), such that each reference point can be thought as a column
vector. In addition, we define o1 = (p′ a′)′ and o2 = (q′ b′)′, such that o = (o′1 o′2)′.
We assume that the set of reference points O is compact, i.e., closed and bounded.
There are several examples satisfying this condition; for instance, when there are a finite
number of reference points, or when the demand correspondence that generates the data
set is compact-valued. Hence, in the latter case, compactness of O follows from assuming
that x(p, px) is a compact set, which ensures that the entire set P ×X is compact.17
We consider a reference-dependent utility function, u• : O2×X → R, that rationalizes
the data. That is, for every pair o = (o′1 o′2)′ ∈ O2 and for all y ∈ X, if px ≥ (>)py, then
it must be the case that uo(x) ≥ (>)uo(y). We further assume that u• is continuous, or
more precisely, that it is continuous at the reference point for every commodity bundle.
Moreover, we assume that the reference-dependent utility functions are independent of
permutations, so that uo1o2 = uo2o1 for all o1, o2 ∈ O.
Let Σ denote a Borel σ-algebra defined on O, and let ∆(O,Σ) denote the simplex
of Borel probability measures defined on O (We write ∆(O) = ∆(O,Σ)).18 The next
definition introduces the generalized maximin preference function:
Definition 20. (Generalized Maximin (strict) preference model) We say that the preference
function r(x, y) is a generalized maximin (strict) preference function if, for any x, y ∈ X,
it can be written as:
r(x, y) = max
µ∈∆(O)
min
λ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
(uo1o2(x)− uo1o2(y))dλ(o1)dµ(o2),
where, for any reference point o ∈ O2, the ’local’ utility function, uo(·), is continuous,
strictly increasing, and (strictly) concave.
The next result shows that the generalized maximin preference function r is skew-
symmetric:
17Note that compact-valuedness of the demand correspondence graph is a very general assumption and
holds for the case of continuous preferences maximized over linear budget sets when the sets of prices and
wealth are compact.
18The set ∆(O,Σ) is endowed with the usual weak∗ topology. Specifically, since O is a metrizable
space, the topology is endowed with the Prokhorov metric. Also note that ∆(O,Σ) is a compact metric
space, because O is assumed to be a compact metric space. This follows from Alaoglu’s theorem (See
e.g., Dunford and Schwartz 1958, p.424, Theorem V.4.2).
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Lemma 2. If r is a generalized maximin preference function, then for any x, y ∈ X, we
have:
r(x, y) = min
λ∈∆(O)
max
µ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
(uo1o2(x)− uo1o2(y))dλ(o1)dµ(o2)
= max
µ∈∆(O)
min
λ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
(uo1o2(x)− uo1o2(y))dλ(o1)dµ(o2),
and moreover, r is skew-symmetric.
The first part of Lemma 2 follows from the continuous version of Von-Neumann’s
minimax theorem in Glicksberg (1950), and by the definition of u• that guarantees that it
is a continuous mapping.19 In this framework, we define the concept of rationalization as
follows:
Definition 21. (Preference function rationalization) Consider an infinite data set O∞
and a preference function r : X ×X 7→ R. For all x, y ∈ X such that py ≤ (<)px,
• the data O∞ is weakly rationalized by r if r(x, y) ≥ 0.
• the data O∞ is strictly rationalized by r if r(x, y) > 0 whenever x 6= y.
Definition 22. (Maximin preference rationalization) The data O∞ is weakly (strictly)
rationalized by a maximin (strict maximin) preference function r if r is a maximin (strict
maximin) preference function as stated in Definition 20, and O∞ is weakly (strictly)
rationalized by r as stated in Definition 21.
The next theorem shows that WGARP (WARP) is a necessary and sufficient condition
for an infinite data set to be rationalized by a maximin (strict) preference function:
Theorem 5. Consider an infinite data set O∞. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The data O∞ can be (strictly) weakly rationalized by a locally nonsatiated and
skew-symmetric preference function.
(ii) The data O∞ satisfies (WARP) WGARP.
(iii) The data O∞ can be (strictly) weakly rationalized by a generalized maximin preference
function.
(iv) The data O∞ can be (strictly) weakly rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing,
(strictly) piecewise concave, and skew-symmetric preference function.
19Note that we can always construct a continuous u•, if we build the utilities associated with each
reference point following Varian (1982). We extend this technical point in the proof of the main theorem
of this section.
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Some remarks are pertinent:
First, if the data O∞ satisfies WARP, then it must hold for any observation (p, x) ∈ O∞
that x = x(p, px), in which case the demand correspondence is actually a demand function.
Hence, in the weak sense, Theorem 5 rationalizes demand correspondences satisfying
WGARP, and in the strict sense, it rationalizes demand functions satisfying WARP.
Second, Theorem 5 generalizes the results in Kim and Richter (1986) and Quah (2006).
Specifically, the key assumption in these papers is that the demand correspondence satisfies
an invertibility condition, i.e., that for every commodity bundle x ∈ X, there exists a price
p ∈ P at which x is demanded (with wealth px). In contrast, the results in Theorem 5
are not based on any such invertibility condition. Hence, our results are derived under
weaker assumptions than in Kim and Richter (1986) and Quah (2006). Note that the
invertibility condition is violated in our motivating example (Example 1).
Third, as discussed above, our main assumption is that the graph of the demand
correspondence is compact. Note that, for the case of demand functions, this is trivially
true. For demand correspondences, maximizing a continuous preference function on
compact sets of prices and wealth, implies, by Berge’s maximum theorem, that the
correspondence is compact-valued. Consequently, this assumption is indeed a very weak
condition.20
Finally, we have not explicitly assumed homogeneity of degree zero. In fact, homo-
geneity can be imposed, since it is implied by maximin rationalization, and as such, we
can normalize wealth to 1 without loss of generality.
7.2. Law of Demand
This subsection is devoted to a characterization of the law of demand for infinite data
sets, defined as:
Definition 23. (Law of demand) The law of demand holds if, for all x, y ∈ X:
(p− q)(x− y) ≤ 0,
such that x ∈ x(p, px) and y ∈ x(q, qy).
Under this definition, with the notation and assumptions from the previous subsection,
we define the generalized maximin quasilinear preference function as follows:
Definition 24. We say that the preference function r(x, y) is a generalized maximin
20We note that the compactness condition can be relaxed to some degree if we substitute the min and
max operators by supremum and infimum. However, this will result in some additional technicalities that
are not of any practical interest.
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quasilinear preference function if, for any x, y ∈ X, it can be written as:
r(x, y) = max
µ∈∆(O)
min
λ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
(uo1o2(x)− uo1o2(y))dλ(o1)dµ(o2),
where, for any reference point o ∈ O2, the ’local’ utility function, uo(·), is continuous,
strictly increasing, concave, and quasilinear.
The following definitions introduce the concept of rationalization:
Definition 25. (Preference function rationalization) Consider an infinite data set O∞,
and a preference function r : X ×X 7→ R. For all x, y ∈ X:
r(x, y)− p(x− y) ≥ 0.
Definition 26. (Maximin quasilinear preference rationalization) The data O∞ is rational-
ized by a maximin quasilinear preference function r if r is a maximin quasilinear preference
function as stated in Definition 24, and O∞ is rationalized by r as stated in Definition 25.
The next theorem shows that the law of demand is a necessary and sufficient condition
for an infinite data set to be rationalized by a maximin quasilinear preference function:
Theorem 6. Consider an infinite data set O∞. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The data O∞ can be rationalized by a locally nonsatiated, skew-symmetric, and
quasilinear preference function.
(ii) The data O∞ satisfies the law of demand.
(iii) The data O∞ can be rationalized by a generalized maximin quasilinear preference
function.
(iv) The data O∞ can be rationalized by a continuous, strictly increasing, concave,
skew-symmetric, and quasilinear preference function.
8. Related Literature
In this section, we extend our discussion of the relation of our findings with previous
works. As already stated, the closest works to our contribution are Kim and Richter
(1986) and Quah (2006). Both works provide rationalizations of demand correspondences,
or functions, consistent with WGARP or WARP, using additional conditions on the
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invertibility of demand, with preferences that are convex (in a certain sense).21 Our work
generalizes those contributions by (i) providing a rationalization of WGARP/WARP for
finite data sets, and (ii) relaxing the requirement that for every commodity bundle in X,
there is a price in its supporting set (i.e., the set of prices at which the commodity bundle
is chosen is nonempty) for the case of infinite data sets. As we have seen in Example 1,
there are commodities with an empty supporting set. This is equivalent to a failure of
invertibility of the demand correspondence or function.
Instead, our work imposes a weak technical condition, namely, compactness of the
graph of the demand correspondence. Under this condition, we show that WGARP is
equivalent to maximin rationalization, namely, the infinite data set can be rationalized
by a continuous, skew-symmetric, strictly increasing, and piecewise concave preference
function. To the best of our knowledge, this result is new in the revealed-preference
literature, and in the classical demand analysis.
The notion of preference functions is not new. Preference functions with the skew-
symmetry property were introduced by Shafer (1974). We have shown that rationalization
by skew-symmetric preferences is essentially equivalent to WGARP. Moreover, we have
also shown that WGARP is equivalent to rationalization by a new kind of preference
function, the maximin preference function. Our results provide a comprehensive answer
to the conjecture posed in Kihlstrom, Mas-Colell, and Sonnenschein (1976), concerning
the equivalence between Shafer’s skew-symmetric preference functions and WGARP.
Krauss (1985) provides a representation of 2-monotone operators (effectively equivalent
to the law of demand), by means of a skew-symmetric preference function. To our
knowledge, our results regarding WGARP are new in the mathematical literature on
monotone operators as well, extending the contribution of Krauss (1985) to 2-cyclical
consistent operators (effectively equivalent to WGARP). We also provide an extension for
the original representation of the law of demand, connecting it with maximin quasilinear
rationality, as in Brown and Calsamiglia (2007), as well as covering the case of limited
data sets.
9. Conclusion
This paper has provided a new notion of rationalization, the maximin preference
function, which is equivalent to Samuelson’s WGARP. It has built a comprehensive theory
of (weak) revealed preference on the basis of this notion.
21The notions of convexity of preferences in Kim-Richter and Quah are implied by convexity of
preferences but convexity is not implied by their restrictions.
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Appendix
Proofs of Section 3: Characterizations of WGARP and WARP
Proof of Theorem 1
(i) =⇒ (ii).– Let r(x, y) be skew-symmetric utility function that weakly rationalizes the
data. Suppose there is a violation of WGARP, so that ptxt ≥ ptxs and psxs > psxt for
some pair of observations s, t ∈ T. Then by weak rationalization in Definition 8 we have
r(xt, xs) ≥ 0. Suppose first that r(xs, xt) > 0. But this results in a contradiction, since by
skew-symmetry −r(xs, xt) = r(xt, xs), which implies r(xt, xs) ≥ 0 > −r(xs, xt) = r(xt, xs).
Suppose next that r(xs, xt) = 0. But then by local nonsatiation there exists y ∈ B(xt, )
for some small  > 0 such that psxs > psy with r(xs, y) < 0, which contradicts that r
weakly rationalizes the data. Thus, there cannot exist a locally nonsatiated function
r(xs, xt) = 0 such that psxs > psxt.
(ii) =⇒ (v).– Suppose that WGARP in condition (ii) holds. For every pair of observations
in the data set OT , we let O2st denote the data set consisting of the two observations s, t ∈ T.
Overall, we have T 2 such data sets, which exhausts all possible pairwise comparisons
in OT . For the two observations in every data set O2st, we define the Afriat function
ust : X → R as in Afriat’s theorem (See e.g., Varian 1982). From Afriat’s theorem we
know that ust is continuous, concave and strictly increasing. Next, for all x, y ∈ X, we
define the mapping: rst : X ×X → R as:
rst (x, y) =
 ust (x)− ust (y) if s 6= t,pt (x− y) if s = t.
Clearly, rst is continuous in x and y, concave in x and convex in y (since ust is continuous
and concave). Moreover, it is skew-symmetric since rst(y, x) = ust(y)−ust(x) = −rst(x, y).
Notice that since the function rst is constructed for every (s, t)− pair of observations in
OT we have a collection of T 2 functions rst.
Let the T − 1 dimensional simplex be denoted as ∆ = {λ ∈ RT+|
∑T
t=1 λt = 1}. Define
the preference function r(x, y) for any x, y ∈ X as:
r(x, y) = min
λ∈∆
max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(x, y)
= max
µ∈∆
min
λ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(x, y).
We prove that the function r weakly rationalizes the data set OT . Consider y ∈ X and
some fixed t ∈ T such that ptxt ≥ pty. Let µt ∈ ∆ be the T − 1 simplex such that µtj = 0
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if j 6= t and µtj = 1 if j = t. Then we have:
r(xt, y) = max
µ∈∆
min
λ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(xt, y)
≥ min
λ∈∆
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈T
λiµ
t
jrij(xt, y)
= min
λ∈∆
∑
i∈T
λirit(xt, y).
It suffices to show that rit(xt, y) ≥ 0 whenever ptxt ≥ pty for each data set O2it. But this
follows directly from the definition of rit and Afriat’s theorem. Hence, r(x, y) ≥ 0.
(v) =⇒ (vi) .– Here, we verify that the preference function r constructed in condition
(v) is skew-symmetric, continuous, strictly increasing and piecewise concave (in x and also
piecewise convex in y). First, we show skew-symmetry. We have:
−r(x, y) = −min
λ∈∆
max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(x, y)
= max
λ∈∆
min
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµt(−rst(x, y)),
Since rst is skew-symmetric (i.e., −rst(x, y) = rst(y, x)), we have (using Lemma 1):
−r(x, y) = max
λ∈∆
min
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµt(−rst(x, y))
= max
λ∈∆
min
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(y, x)
= min
µ∈∆
max
λ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(y, x)
= r(y, x),
which proves that r is skew-symmetric.
Second, we show that r is continuous. The simplex ∆ consists of a finite number of
elements and is therefore compact. Moreover, from above, we know that rst is continuous.
Hence, for any λ, µ ∈ ∆, the function
f(x, y;λ, µ) =
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(x, y),
is continuous. By a direct application of Berge’s maximum theorem (e.g., Moore 1999,
p.280) it follows that r(x, y) = minλ∈∆ maxµ∈∆ f(x, y;λ, µ) is a continuous function of
x, y ∈ X.
Third, we show that r is strictly increasing. Consider any x, y, z ∈ X such that x > y.
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Then:
rst(x, z) = ust(x)− ust(z)
> ust(y)− ust(z)
= rst(y, z),
where ust(x) > ust(y) follows by Afriat’s theorem. This implies:
max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(x, z) > max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(y, z),
for all λ ∈ ∆. Thus, r(x, z) > r(y, z).
Fourth, we show that r is piecewise concave in its first argument (and piecewise
convex in its second argument). Consider any x ∈ X and a fixed z ∈ X. The function
rst(x, z) = ust(x) − ust(z) is concave in x since ust(x) is concave by Afriat’s theorem
and the difference between a concave function and a constant is concave. Moreover, the
function fz(x;λ, µ) =
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T λsµtrst(x, z) is concave for any λ, µ ∈ ∆, since the linear
combination of concave functions is concave. Since concavity is preserved under the
pointwise minimum operator, it follows that the function gz(x;λ) = minµ∈∆ fz(x;λ, µ)
is concave in the first argument for all λ ∈ ∆. Thus, by Definition 7 the function
hz(x) = maxλ∈∆ gz(x;λ) is piecewise concave. By skew-symmetry the mapping r is
piecewise convex in the second argument. This completes the proof.
(vi) =⇒ (i).– Trivial.
(ii) =⇒ (iii).– Suppose that WGARP holds. Consider once again the data set O2ts, and
recall that we have T 2 such data sets, which exhausts all possible pairwise comparisons in
the data set OT . Obviously, for the two observations in each data set O2ts, WGARP is
equivalent to GARP. By a direct application of Afriat’s theorem, the following conditions
are equivalent: (i) the data set O2st satisfies WGARP, (ii) there exist numbers Ukts and
λkts > 0 for all k ∈ {t, s} such that the Afriat inequalities: Ukts − U lts ≥ λktspk(xk − xl) hold
for all k, l ∈ {t, s}. Now, notice that the two data sets O2ts and O2st contain the same
two bundles and that permuting the data is insignificant for Afriat’s theorem. Thus,
without loss of generality, we can set Ukts = Ukst and λkts = λkst for all k ∈ {t, s}. By defining
Rt,s = U tts − U sts and Rs,t = U sts − U tts, we get the inequalities in condition (iii).
(iii) =⇒ (iv).– Suppose that condition (iii) holds. Since λtts > 0, if pt(xt − xs) ≥ 0 then
Rt,s ≥ 0, and if pt(xt − xs) > 0 then Rt,s > 0. Define W t,s = Rt,s for all s, t ∈ T and the
proof follows.
(iv) =⇒ (ii).– Suppose that the inequalities in condition (iv) holds, but that WGARP is
violated, i.e., pt(xt − xs) ≥ 0 and ps(xs − xt) > 0 for some s, t ∈ T. Then W t,s ≥ 0 and
W s,t > 0. Thus, W t,s +W s,t > 0, which violates the inequalities in condition (iv).
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Remarks.– The numbers W t,s in condition (iv) can be constructed directly from WGARP
by considering the following simple proof that condition (ii) implies (iv). Suppose that
WGARP holds. For all s, t ∈ T set W t,s = pt(xt − xs) − ps(xs − xt). We verify that
this construction works. First, notice that W s,t = ps(xs − xt) − pt(xt − xs). Thus,
W t,s +W s,t = 0 since:
W t,s +W s,t = (pt(xt − xs)− ps(xs − xt)) + (ps(xs − xt)− pt(xt − xs))
= pt(xt − xs)− pt(xt − xs)− ps(xs − xt) + ps(xs − xt)
= 0.
Second, notice that if pt(xt − xs) ≥ 0 then ps(xs − xt) ≤ 0, otherwise we would have a
violation of WGARP. Thus, W t,s = pt(xt − xs)− ps(xs − xt) ≥ 0. Also, if pt(xt − xs) > 0
then W t,s = pt(xt − xs)− ps(xs − xt) > 0.
Proof of Theorem 2
(i) =⇒ (ii).– Let r(x, y) be skew-symmetric utility function that strictly rationalizes the
data. Suppose there is a violation of WARP, so that ptxt ≥ ptxs and psxs ≥ psxt with
xs 6= xt for some pair of observations s, t ∈ T. Then, by strict rationalization in Definition
8, we have r(xt, xs) > 0 and r(xs, xt) > 0. But this violates skew-symmetry.
(ii) =⇒ (v).– Since this proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we only give the
main parts (and the parts that differ).
Suppose that WARP in condition (ii) holds. For all s, t ∈ T, we let the data set O2st
consist of the two observations s, t ∈ T. Overall, this gives T 2 such data sets. For the
two observations in each data set O2st, we define the function ust : X → R as in Matzkin
and Richter’s (1991) theorem. From this, we know that each function ust is continuous,
strictly concave and strictly increasing. Next, for all x, y ∈ X, we define the mapping:
rst : X ×X → R as:
rst (x, y) =
 ust (x)− ust (y) if s 6= t,pt (x− y)− ε(g(x− xt)− g(y − xt)), if s = t.
for some small ε > 0 and where the function g is defined in Matzkin and Richter (1991).
Clearly, each function rs,t is continuous, strictly concave and skew-symmetric.
Define the preference function r(x, y) for any x, y ∈ X as:
r(x, y) = min
λ∈∆
max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(x, y)
= max
µ∈∆
min
λ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(x, y).
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We prove that the function r strictly rationalizes the data set OT . Consider y ∈ X and
some fixed t ∈ T such that xt 6= y and ptxt ≥ pty. Let µt ∈ ∆ be the T − 1 simplex such
that µtj = 0 if j 6= t and µtj = 1 if j = t. By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem
1, we have
r(xt, y) ≥ min
λ∈∆
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈T
λiµ
t
jrij(xt, y)
= min
λ∈∆
∑
i∈T
λirit(xt, y).
It suffices to show that rit(xt, y) > 0 whenever xt 6= y and ptxt ≥ pty for each data set
O2it. But this follows directly from the definition of rit and Matzkin and Richter’s (1991)
theorem. Hence, r(x, y) > 0.
(v) =⇒ (vi).– We verify that the preference function r constructed in condition (v) is
skew-symmetric, continuous, strictly increasing and piecewise strictly concave in x (and
piecewise strictly convex in y).
By the exact same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1, it can be shown that the
function r(x, y) is skew-symmetric, continuous and strictly increasing. Thus, it suffices
to show that it is piecewise strictly concave in x (and piecewise strictly convex in y).
Consider any x ∈ X and a fixed z ∈ X. The function rst(x, z) = ust(x)− ust(z) is strictly
concave in x since ust(x) is strictly concave and ust(z) can be treated as a constant. Since
the linear combination of strictly concave functions is strictly concave, it follows that
the function fz(x;λ, µ) =
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T λsµtrst(x, z) is strictly concave for any λ, µ ∈ ∆. It
then follows that the function gz(x;λ) = minµ∈∆ fz(x;λ, µ) is strictly concave in the first
argument for all λ ∈ ∆. Hence, the function hz(x) = maxλ∈∆ gz(x;λ) is piecewise strictly
concave. By skew-symmetry the mapping r is piecewise strictly convex in y.
(vi) =⇒ (i).– Trivial.
(ii) =⇒ (iii).– Suppose that WARP holds. Consider the T 2 data sets O2ts for every
pair of observations s, t ∈ T. By a direct application of Matzkin and Richter’s (1991)
theorem, the following conditions are equivalent: (i) the data set O2st satisfies WARP,
(ii) there exist numbers Ukts and λkts > 0 for all k ∈ {t, s} such that the inequalities:
if xk 6= xl then, Ukts − U lts > λktspk
(
xk − xl
)
, and if xk = xl then, Ukts − U lts = 0 hold for
all k, l ∈ {t, s}. Since permuting the data is insignificant for Matzkin and Richter’s (1991)
theorem, we can without loss of generality set Ukts = Ukst and λkts = λkst for all k ∈ {t, s}. We
obtain the inequalities in condition (iii) by defining Rt,s = U tts − U sts and Rs,t = U sts − U tts.
(iii) =⇒ (iv).– Suppose that condition (iii) holds. If x 6= xt and pt(xt − xs) ≥ 0 then
Rt,s > 0. We obtain condition (iv) by defining W t,s = Rt,s for all s, t ∈ T.
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(iv) =⇒ (ii).– Suppose that the inequalities in condition (iv) holds, but that WARP is
violated, i.e., pt(xt − xs) ≥ 0 and ps(xs − xt) ≥ 0 with xt 6= xs for some s, t ∈ T. Then
W t,s > 0 and W s,t > 0. Thus, W t,s+W s,t > 0, which violates the inequalities in condition
(iv).
Proofs of Section 4: Recoverability of Preferences
Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of the first part of the theorem follows from the discussion in Section 4.2.
Next, we provide a simple proof of the second part.
Since RWst(x) ⊇ RW (x), we have that NRWst(x) ⊆ NRW (x). Thus, by construction,
this implies NRWW (x) ⊆ NRW (x).
We are going to show that NRWw(x) ⊂ NRW (x) for some x ∈ X. Consider
Example 1. Clearly, the bundle x− = (1, 1, 1) is monotonically dominated by xT+1. First,
note that the upper bound using the naive approach contains this dominated option
x− ∈ NRW (x) = X \xT+1. Second, note that for all s, t ∈ T and by strictly monotonicity,
we must have ust(xT+1) > ust(x−) (this follows by Afriat’s theorem applied to the data
set O2st). This implies that x− /∈ NRWst(xT+1) for all t, s ∈ T.
It also follows that RP (w) ⊆ RPW (x), since we know that that RP (x) ⊆ RPst(x), for
all s, t ∈ T.
Consider again, in the context of Example 1, the bundle x− = (1, 1, 1). We are going
to show that xT+1 = (2, 2, 2) is not in RP (x−), but that it is in RPW (x−). From the
example, we know that S(xT+1) = ∅, which implies xT+1 /∈ RP (x−). However, we know
that p(xT+1−x−) > 0 for all p ∈ P , which means that for the local utility that rationalizes
O2st, we have ust(xT+1) > ust(x−) for all s, t ∈ T. This means that xT+1 ∈ RPst(x−) for
all s, t ∈ T. Hence, xT+1 ∈ RPW (x−).
Proofs of Section 6: Shape Constraints: Concave Rationalization and the Law of
Demand
Proof of Theorem E
(i) =⇒ (ii).– By the definition of rationalization in Definition 15, we have for any
observation s ∈ T with x = xs,
u(xt)− ptxt ≥ u(xs)− ptxs.
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Thus, after rearranging terms, for any sequence of distinct choices of indices (1, 2, 3, ..., n) ∈
T, we have:
p1x2 − p1x1 ≥ u(x2)− u(x1),
p2x3 − p2x2 ≥ u(x3)− u(x2),
...
pnx1 − pnxn ≥ u(x1)− u(xn).
Adding up both sides, we get:
(p1x2 − p1x1) + (p2x3 − p2x2) + · · ·+ (pnx1 − pnxn)
≥ (u(x2)− u(x1)) + (u(x3)− u(x2)) + · · ·+ (u(x1)− u(xn))
= 0.
Thus,
p1(x1 − x2) + p2(x2 − x3) + · · ·+ pn(xn − x1) ≤ 0,
which is the strong law of demand.
(ii) =⇒ (iii).– Suppose that condition (ii) holds and define:
U t = min
{1,2,3,...,n,t}∈T
{p1(x2 − x1) + p2(x3 − x2) + · · ·+ pn(xt − xn)},
for all t ∈ T. That is, U t is a minimum of the given expression over all sequences starting
anywhere and terminating at t. Note that there are only finitely many sequences because
their elements are distinct. Hence, the minimum always exists. To show that the numbers
U t do satisfy the inequalities in statement (iii), suppose that:
U t = p1(x2 − x1) + p2(x3 − x2) + · · ·+ pn(xt − xn),
U s = pa(xb − xa) + pb(xc − xb) + · · ·+ pm(xs − xm),
for some distinct sequences {1, 2, 3, ...n, t} ∈ T and {a, b, c, ...,m, s} ∈ T. Then:
U t = p1(x2 − x1) + p2(x3 − x2) + · · ·+ pn(xt − xn)
≤ pa(xb − xa) + pb(xc − xb) + · · ·+ pm(xs − xm) + ps(xt − xs)
= U s + ps(xt − xs),
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since the value on the left-hand side of the inequality is a minimum over all paths to t.
Hence,
U t ≤ U s + ps(xt − xs),
for all s, t ∈ T, which are the inequalities in statement (iii).
(iii) =⇒ (iv).– Suppose that condition (iii) holds. For all x ∈ X, define the function:
u(x) = min
s∈T
{U s + ps(x− xs)}
Since u is defined as the lower envelope of a set of linear functions, it is continuous, strictly
increasing and concave. Moreover, it is easy to show that u(xt) = U t for all t ∈ T. Finally,
for all x ∈ X and all t ∈ T:
u(x)− ptx = min
s∈T
{U s + ps(x− xs)} − ptx
≤ U t + pt(x− xt)− ptx
= U t − ptxt
= u(xt)− ptxt.
Thus, u weakly rationalizes the data set OT .
(iv) =⇒ (i).– Trivial.
Proof of Theorem 4
(i) =⇒ (ii).– If the data set OT can be rationalized by a skew-symmetric and quasilinear
preference function, then for all t ∈ T and all x ∈ X,
r(xt, x) ≥ pt(xt − x).
In particular, it must be that for x = xs, r(xt, xs) ≥ pt(xt − xs). Analogously, we have
r(xs, xt) ≥ ps(xs − xt) for all s, t ∈ T. Adding these inequalities, and by skew-symmetry,
we have:
0 = r(xt, xs) + r(xs, xt) ≥ pt(xt − xs) + ps(xs − xt).
Rearranging terms, we get:
(pt − ps)(xt − xs) ≤ 0,
for all s, t ∈ T, which is the law of demand.
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(ii) =⇒ (iii).– Assume that condition (ii) holds and define:
Rs,t = 12(p
s(xs − xt)− pt(xt − xs)).
Clearly, Rs,t = −Rt,s for all s, t ∈ T. Moreover,
Rs,t = 12(p
s(xs − xt)− pt(xt − xs))
= 12(p
s(xs − xt) + pt(xs − xt))
= 12(p
s(xs − xt)− pt(xs − xt) + 2pt(xs − xt)).
By condition (ii), we have
ps(xs − xt)− pt(xs − xt) = (ps − pt)(xs − xt) ≤ 0.
Hence,
Rs,t = 12(p
s(xs − xt)− pt(xs − xt) + 2pt(xs − xt)
= 12(p
s(xs − xt)− pt(xs − xt)) + pt(xs − xt)⇐⇒
Rs,t − pt(xs − xt) = 12(p
s(xs − xt)− pt(xs − xt))
≤ 0,
which implies:
−Rs,t ≥ −pt
(
xs − xt
)
⇐⇒
Rt,s ≥ pt
(
xt − xs
)
.
This completes the proof.
(iii) =⇒ (iv).– As in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, we break OT into T 2 pairwise
data sets O2st = {(pt, xt), (ps, xs)} for all s, t ∈ T. For the two observations in every data
set O2st, we define the function ust(x) : X → R as in the proof of Theorem E. From
Theorem E, we know that ust is continuous, strictly increasing, concave, quasilinear and
weakly rationalizes the data O2st.
For all x, y ∈ X, we define the mapping: rst : X ×X → R as:
rst (x, y) =
 ust (x)− ust (y) if s 6= t,pt (x− y) if s = t.
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Next, we define the maximin quasilinear preference function, r, for any x, y ∈ X, as:
r(x, y) = min
λ∈∆
max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(x, y)
= max
µ∈∆
min
λ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(x, y).
We show that the maximin quasilinear preference function rationalizes the data set OT .
Consider y ∈ X and some fixed t ∈ T. Let µt ∈ ∆ be the T − 1 simplex such that µtj = 0
if j 6= t and µtj = 1 if j = t. We have:
r(xt, y) = max
µ∈∆
min
λ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(xt, y)
≥ min
λ∈∆
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈T
λiµ
t
jrij(xt, y)
= min
λ∈∆
∑
i∈T
λirit(xt, y).
It suffices to show that rit(xt, y) ≥ ptxt − pty, for each data set O2it. But this follows
directly from the definition of rit and weak rationalization. Hence, r(x, y) ≥ ptxt− pty for
all y ∈ X and all t ∈ T.
(iv) =⇒ (i).– Using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1 it follows that
the maximin quasilinear preference function r constructed above is continuous, skew-
symmetric, strictly increasing (in x), piecewise concave in x, piecewise convex in y and
quasilinear.
(iii) =⇒ (v).– Suppose that condition (iii) holds and define for all x, y ∈ X the functions:
rst (x, y) = Rs,t + ps (x− xs)− pt
(
y − xt
)
.
Clearly, the function rst is continuous, strictly increasing and concave in x and convex in
y. Since Rs,t = −Rt,s, we have:
−rst (x, y) = −
(
Rs,t + ps (x− xs)− pt
(
y − xt
))
= Rt,s + pt
(
y − xt
)
− ps (x− xs)
= rts (y, x) .
Let the T − 1 dimensional simplex be denoted ∆ = {λ ∈ RT+|
∑T
t=1 λt = 1}. Define the
preference function r(x, y) for any x, y ∈ X as:
r(x, y) = min
λ∈∆
max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(x, y)
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= max
µ∈∆
min
λ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(x, y).
We show that the function r is skew-symmetric, continuous, strictly increasing and
concave. First, we show skew-symmetry:
−r(x, y) = −min
λ∈∆
max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(x, y)
= max
λ∈∆
min
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
−λsµtrst(x, y)
= max
λ∈∆
min
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
−λsµtrts(y, x)
= r(y, x),
since −rst(x, y) = rts(y, x).
Second, we show that r is continuous. The simplex ∆ consists of a finite number of
elements and is therefore compact. Moreover, from above, we know that rst is continuous.
Hence, for any λ, µ ∈ ∆, the function
f(x, y;λ, µ) =
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst(x, y),
is continuous. By a direct application of Berge’s maximum theorem it follows that
r(x, y) = minλ∈∆ maxµ∈∆ f(x, y;λ, µ) is a continuous function of x, y ∈ X.
Third, we show that r is strictly increasing. Consider x, y, z ∈ X such that x > y.
Since each function rst is strictly increasing we have:
max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λtµsrst(x, z) > max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λtµsrst(y, z),
for all ∆. Hence,
min
λ∈∆
max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λtµsrst(x, z) > min
λ∈∆
max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λtµsrst(y, z),
which shows that r is strictly increasing in the first argument x.
Fourth, we will show that r(x, y) is concave in x. Fix y and λ ∈ ∆, and consider the
function:
rλ (x) = max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst (x, y) .
We have:
rλ (x) = max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst (x, y)
= max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµt
(
Rs,t + ps (x− xs)− pt
(
y − xt
))
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= max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
λs
∑
t∈T
(
µtR
s,t + µtps (x− xs)− µtpt
(
y − xt
))
= max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
λs
ps (x− xs) +∑
t∈T
(
µtR
s,t − µtpt
(
y − xt
))
=
∑
s∈T
λsp
s (x− xs) + max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
(
µtR
s,t − µtpt
(
y − xt
))
.
Clearly, rλ (x) is linear in x and, as such, concave. Hence, r (x, y) = minλ∈∆ rλ (x) is the
minimum over a set of linear function and is therefore also concave.
Finally, we show that r is a quasilinear preference function that rationalizes the data.
For all x ∈ X and all t ∈ T:
r
(
xt, x
)
= min
λ∈∆
max
µ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
t∈T
λsµtrst
(
xt, x
)
≥ min
λ∈∆
∑
s∈T
∑
v∈T
λsµ
t
vrsv
(
xt, x
)
= min
λ∈∆
∑
t∈T
λsrst
(
xt, x
)
,
where µtv = 1 when v = t and zero otherwise. Note that the term pt(x − xt) does not
depend on s, which implies:
r(xt, x) ≥ min
λ∈∆
∑
s∈T
λsrst
(
xt, x
)
= min
λ∈∆
∑
s∈T
λs
(
Rs,t + ps
(
xt − xs
)
− pt
(
x− xt
))
= −∑
s∈T
λsp
t
(
x− xt
)
+ min
λ∈∆
∑
s∈T
λs
(
Rs,t + ps
(
xt − xs
))
= −pt
(
x− xt
)
+ min
λ∈∆
∑
s∈T
λs
(
Rs,t + ps
(
xt − xs
))
.
We conclude that r is a quasilinear preference function that weakly rationalizes the data
OT since:
r
(
xt, x
)
− pt
(
xt − x
)
= min
λ∈∆
∑
s∈T
λs
(
Rs,t + ps
(
xt − xs
))
≥ 0,
because Rs,t + ps (xt − xs) ≥ 0 by condition (iii) and λs ≥ 0 for all s, t ∈ T.
(v) =⇒ (i).– Trivial.
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Proofs of Section 7: Infinite Data Sets: Characterizations of WGARP and WARP.
In order to prove Theorem 5, we need an auxiliary lemma, which is a modification of
Algorithm 3 in Varian (1982).
Lemma 3. Consider a finite data set OT , and suppose that OT satisfies SARP. Then:
(i) There exist numbers U t and λt > 0 for all t ∈ T, such that the inequalities:
U t − U s ≥ λtpt(xt − xs),
hold for all s, t ∈ T, with a strict inequality when xt 6= xs.
(ii) There exists a continuous function that maps the data set OT to the numbers U t, λt
for all t ∈ T.
Proof. We begin with (i). Let g : RL → R++ be any continuous function such that
g(x) = 0 if and only if x = 0, and let  > 0 be a scalar. For any subset I of T, let max I
denote the index of a maximum element of OT relative to the revealed preference order.
Consider the following algorithm:
Input: A set of price-quantity observations OT satisfying SARP.
Output: Numbers U t and λt > 0 for all t ∈ T satisfying the inequalities in statement (i).
1. Let I = {1, ..., n} and B 6= ∅.
2. Let m = max(I).
3. Set E = {i ∈ I : xi R xm}. If B = ∅, then set Um = λm = 1 and go to step 6; else
go to step 4.
4. Set Um = mini∈E minj∈B min{U j + λjpj(xi − xj)− g(xi − xj)}.
5. Set λm = maxi∈E maxj∈B max{(U j − Um + g(xj − xm))/pm(xi − xm)}.
6. Set I = I \ E and B = B ∪ E. If I 6= ∅, then stop; otherwise, go to step 2.
We now prove that this algorithm generates numbers U t and λt > 0 for all t ∈ T that
satisfies the inequalities in statement (i). From step 4, we have:
Um ≤ U j + λjpj(xm − xj)− g(xm − xj),
and
λm ≥ (U j − Um + g(xm − xj))/pm(xj − xm),
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for all m, j ∈ T. This implies that:
U j − Um ≤ λmpm(xj − xm)− g(xm − xj),
for all m, j ∈ T. Hence, this shows that the algorithm guarantees that there exist numbers
U t and λt > 0 for all t ∈ T satisfying the inequalities in statement (i).
Moreover, it is clear that this algorithm provides a continuous function that maps the
data set OT to the numbers U t, λt for all t ∈ T, which proves statement (ii). 
Proof of Theorem 5
(i) =⇒ (ii).– Trivial.
(ii) =⇒ (iii).– Suppose that WGARP in statement (ii) holds. For every pair of observa-
tions in the data set O∞, we let O2 = {(p, a), (q, b)} denote the data set consisting of any
pair (p, a), (q, b) ∈ O∞. Overall, we have a continuum of such data sets, which exhausts all
possible pairwise comparisons in O∞. We rearrange O2 into a vector o = (p′ a′ q′ b′)′ ∈ O2,
where the set of reference points is defined to be O = P ×X with x ∈ x(p, px), such that
each data set O2 can be thought of as a column vector (Recall that under our assumptions
O is a compact and metric space). We define o1 = (p′ a′)′ and o2 = (q′ b′)′, such that
o = (o′1 o′2)′.
Since every data set o satisfies WGARP, we can directly apply Algorithm 3 in Varian
(1982), which specifies a continuous function that maps finite data sets to the numbers Uoi
and λoi > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2} satisfying the Afriat inequalities for every data set o. We can then
use these numbers to define the utility function uo1o2(x) = mini∈{1,2}{Uoi + λoipi(x− xi)}
as in Afriat’s theorem that is continuous for all x ∈ X, strictly increasing and concave on
o (In the case of strict rationalizability, we simply apply Lemma 3, and then define the
function uo1o2 as in Matzkin and Richter’s (1991) theorem. As such, we know that uo1o2 is
continuous, strictly concave and strictly increasing).22
Next, we define the mapping: ro1o2 : X ×X → R as:
ro1o2(x, y) = uo1o2(x)− uo1o2(y),
for all x, y ∈ X. Clearly, ro1o2 is continuous (since uo1o2 is continuous) and (strictly)
concave in the first argument (since uo1o2 is (strictly) concave). Moreover, it is skew-
symmetric since ro1o2(y, x) = uo1o2(y)− uo1o2(x) = −ro1o2(x, y). Notice that since ro1o2 is
constructed for every o−vector of observations in O∞ we have an infinite collection of
22If o1 = o2 then we set uo1o2 = p(x− y) in the weak case and uo1o2 = p(x− y)− (g(x− a)− g(y− b))
in the strict case, for some small scalar  > 0 and a function g defined in Matzkin and Richter’s (1991)
theorem.
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functions ro1o2 .
Define the preference function r(x, y) for any x, y ∈ X as:
r(x, y) = min
λ∈∆(O)
max
µ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
ro1o2(x, y)dλ(o1)dµ(o2)
= max
µ∈∆(O)
min
λ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
ro1o2(x, y)dλ(o1)dµ(o2),
where the second equality follows from Lemma 2.23
We prove that the function r weakly (strictly) rationalizes the data set O∞. Consider
y ∈ X and some fixed o1 = (p′ x′)′ ∈ O such that px ≥ py. Let µo1 ∈ ∆(O) be the
probability measure such that µo1(q, b) = 0 if (q′ b)′ 6= o1 and µo1(q, b) = 1 when (q′ b)′ = o1.
We have:
r(x, y) = max
µ∈∆(O)
min
λ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
ro1o2(x, y)dλ(o1)dµ(o2)
≥ min
λ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
ro1o2(x, y)dλ(o1)dµo1(o2)
= min
λ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
ro1o1(x, y)dλ(o1).
It suffices to show that ro1o1(x, y)(>) ≥ 0 whenever px ≥ py, for each data set o = (o′1 o1)′.
But this follows directly from the definition of ro1o1 and Afriat’s theorem (In the case of
strict rationalizability, it follows from Matzkin and Richter’s (1991) theorem). Specifically,
notice that if px ≥ py then x R,D y for o1 = (p′ x)′ since, in such case, uo1o1(x)(>) ≥
uo1o1(y). Hence, r(x, y)(>) ≥ 0.
(iii) =⇒ (iv).– We verify that the preference function r is skew-symmetric, continuous,
strictly increasing and (strictly) piecewise concave in x (and (strictly) piecewise convex in
y). First, we show skew-symmetry. We have:
−r(x, y) = − min
λ∈∆(O)
max
µ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
ro1o2(x, y)dλ(o1)dµ(o2)
= max
λ∈∆(O)
min
µ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
(−ro1o2(x, y))dλ(o1)dµ(o2).
Since ro1o2 is skew-symmetric (i.e., −ro1o2(x, y) = ro1o2(y, x)), we have −r(x, y) = r(y, x),
which proves that r is skew-symmetric.
Second, we show that r is continuous. The simplex ∆(O) is a compact set and since
ro1o2 is defined as the difference between two continuous functions (by Afriat’s theorem),
23The minimax theorem in Glicksberg (1950) requires that ∆(O) is a compact metric space, and that
r• is a continuous function. We have already shown that this holds by construction, so we can directly
apply this version of the minimax theorem.
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it is continuous itself. Thus, for any λ, µ ∈ ∆(O), the function
f(x, y;λ, µ) =
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
ro1o2(x, y)dλ(o1)dµ(o2),
is continuous. By a direct application of Berge’s maximum theorem it follows that
r(x, y) = minλ∈∆(O) maxµ∈∆(O) f(x, y;λ, µ) is a continuous function of x, y ∈ X.
Third, we show that r is strictly increasing. Consider any x, y, z ∈ X such that x > y.
Then:
ro1o2(x, z) = uo1o2(x)− uo1o2(z)
> uo1o2(y)− uo1o2(z)
= ro1o2(y, z),
where uo1o2(x) > uo1o2(y) follows by Afriat’s theorem. Hence, r(x, z) > r(y, z).
In the case of strict rationalizability, it follows that r satisfies skew-symmetry, continuity
and strict monotonicity by simply replacing Afriat’s theorem with Matzkin and Richter’s
(1991) theorem in the proofs above.
Finally, we show that r is (strictly) piecewise concave in x (and (strictly) piecewise
convex in y). Consider any x ∈ X and a fixed z ∈ X. The function ro1o2(x, z) =
uo1o2(x)− uo1o2(z) is (strictly) concave in x since uo1o2(x) is (strictly) concave by Afriat’s
theorem (Matzkin and Richter’s (1991) theorem) and the difference between a (strictly)
concave function and a constant is (strictly) concave. Moreover, the function fz(x;λ, µ) =∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O ro1o2(x, z)dλ(o1)dµ(o2) is (strictly) concave for any λ, µ ∈ ∆, since the linear
combination of (strictly) concave functions is (strictly) concave. It then follows that the
function gz(x;λ) = minµ∈∆(O) fz(x;λ, µ) is (strictly) concave in the first argument for
all λ ∈ ∆(O). Thus, by definition the function hz(x) = maxλ∈∆(O) gz(x;λ) is (strictly)
piecewise concave. By skew-symmetry the mapping r is (strictly) piecewise convex in the
second argument. This completes the proof.
(iv) =⇒ (i).– Trivial.
Proof of Theorem 6
(i) =⇒ (ii).– Suppose that the data O∞ satisfies statement (i), in which case, for all
x, y ∈ X:
r(x, y) ≥ p(x− y),
and
r(y, x) ≥ q(y − x),
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such that x ∈ x(p, px) and y ∈ x(q, qy). Adding these inequalities, and by skew-symmetry,
we have:
0 = r(x, y) + r(y, x) ≥ p(x− y) + q(y − x).
Rearranging terms, we get:
(p− q)(x− y) ≤ 0,
which is the law of demand.
(ii) =⇒ (iii).– Suppose that statement (ii) holds. Define o1 = (p′ a′)′ and o2 = (q′ b′)′,
such that o = (o′1 o′2)′ as in the proof of Theorem 5. Since the law of demand holds by
definition, we can use the algorithm in the proof of Theorem E to find numbers that
satisfies the inequalities in statement (iii) in Theorem E. As shown in the proof of Theorem
E, these numbers can then be used to construct a continuous, strictly increasing and
concave utility function uo1o2 for all x ∈ X and every o.
We define the mapping: ro1o2 : X ×X → R as:
ro1o2(x, y) = uo1o2(x)− uo1o2(y),
for all x, y ∈ X. Clearly, ro1o2 is continuous, concave (in the first argument and convex in
the second argument), and skew-symmetric.
Next, define the preference function r(x, y) for any x, y ∈ X as:
r(x, y) = min
λ∈∆(O)
max
µ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
ro1o2(x, y)dλ(o1)dµ(o2)
= max
µ∈∆(O)
min
λ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
ro1o2(x, y)dλ(o1)dµ(o2).
We prove that the function r rationalizes the data set O∞. Consider y ∈ X and some
fixed o1 = (p′ x′)′ ∈ O. Let µo1 ∈ ∆(O) be the probability measure such that µo1(q, b) = 0
if (q′ b)′ 6= o1 and µo1(q, b) = 1 when (q′ b)′ = o1. We have:
r(x, y) = max
µ∈∆(O)
min
λ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
ro1o2(x, y)dλ(o1)dµ(o2)
≥ min
λ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
ro1o2(x, y)dλ(o1)dµo1(o2)
= min
λ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
ro1o1(x, y)dλ(o1).
It suffices to show that ro1o1(x, y) ≥ p(x − y) for each data set o = (o′1 o1)′. But this
follows directly from the definition of ro1o1 and Theorem E. Hence, r(x, y) ≥ p(x− y).
(iii) =⇒ (i).– It follows directly from the proof of (ii) =⇒ (iii) that the constructed
generalized maximin quasilinear preference function is also locally nonsatiated and skew-
symmetric.
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(ii) =⇒ (iv).– Suppose that statement (ii) holds. Define o1 = (p′ a′)′ and o2 = (q′ b′)′,
such that o = (o′1 o′2)′ as in the proof of Theorem 5. Since the law of demand holds by
definition, we can use the algorithm in the proof of Theorem E to find numbers that
satisfies the inequalities in statement (iii) in Theorem E. We can define for every dataset
oi, i = 1, 2:
uo1(x) = uo1 + p(x− a)uo2(y) = uo2 + q(y − b).
We define the mapping: ro1o2 : X ×X → R
ro1o2(x, y) = uo1o2(x)− uo1o2(y), ro1o2(x, y) = Ro1,o2 + p(x− a)− q(y − b),
where Ro1,o2 = uo1 − uo2 , for all x, y ∈ X. Clearly, ro1o2 is continuous, linear in both
arguments, and skew-symmetric.
Next, define the preference function r(x, y) for any x, y ∈ X as:
r(x, y) = min
λ∈∆(O)
max
µ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
ro1o2(x, y)dλ(o1)dµ(o2)
= max
µ∈∆(O)
min
λ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
ro1o2(x, y)dλ(o1)dµ(o2).
Exactly as in the proof of (ii) =⇒ (iii), we conclude that r is strictly increasing and
continuous. We show that r is concave: Fix y and λ ∈ ∆(O). Consider:
fλ,y(x) = max
µ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
ro1o2(x, y)dλ(o1)dµ(o2).
We have:
fλ,y(x) = max
µ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
∫
o2∈O
[Ro1,o2 + p(x− a)− q(y − b)]dλ(o1)dµ(o2)
=
∫
o1∈O
[p(x− a) max
µ∈∆(O)
∫
o2∈O
[Ro1,o2 − q(y − b)]dµ(o2)]dλ(o1).
Observe that fλ,y(x) is linear in x and therefore concave. Hence,
r(x, y) = min
λ∈∆(O)
∫
o1∈O
fλ,y(x)dλ(o1),
is the minimum over a set of linear functions and therefore concave.
We omit the proof that the function r rationalizes the data set O∞ because it is
completely analogous to the proof of Theorem 4 ((iii) =⇒ (v)) for the finite data case.
Note that we can use the appropriate minimax theorem for the infinite data case as in
the proof of (ii) =⇒ (iii).
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(iii) =⇒ (i).– It follows directly from the proof of (ii) =⇒ (iii) that the constructed
generalized maximin quasilinear preference function is also locally nonsatiated and skew-
symmetric.
(iv) =⇒ (i).– Trivial.
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